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Courts and commentators often treat intellectual property as if the private value of the rights
stemmed entirely from the control legal rules conferred over the protected subject matter. While the
literature has devoted an enormous amount of time, paper, and ink to the discussion of whether
legal rules grant the optimal amount of exclusivity, it has not considered whether it has been exam-
ining all the functions of patents This Article provides a new general framework for analyzing the
function and effect of intellectual property rule& Rather than focusing on patents as a mechanism
for privatizing information, this Article instead frames patents as a means of credibly publicizing
information. Patents can reduce informational asymmetries between patentees and observers Un-
der some circumstances the informational function of patents may be more valuable to the rights
holder than the substance of the right& The Article presents a model of patents as a signaling
mechanism and considers the multiple equilibria that could result from using patents to convey in-
formation. If an easily measurable firm attribute such as patent counts is positively correlated with
other less readily measurable firm attributes such as knowledge capital, then patent counts can be
used as a means of conveying information about these other attributes Knowing thi; firms may
choose to obtain and use a portfolio of patent rights to signal information about themselves that
would be more expensive to do through other mean& Alternatively, firms can use the patent docu-
ment itself to convey information that would not be as credible when revealed in other contexts
Patent signals can be ambiguous however, reducing information costs along some margins but
raising them along others The Article concludes by exploring the efficiency implications of patents
as informational mechanisms
INTRODUCTION
Courts and commentators often treat intellectual property as if
the private value of the rights stemmed entirely from the control legal
rules conferred over the protected subject matter. Indeed, this as-
sumption is used to justify the very existence of intellectual property
protection. Inventions and artistic creations, if unprotected, become
public goods once revealed. Legal rules allow individuals to maintain
some elements of control over information that would otherwise be
lost to the public domain. Individuals are assumed to be made worse
off by revealing the information comprising the creative work. By
granting exclusive rights to the creative work, legal rules make it pos-
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sible for creators to be compensated for that revelation.! With these
assumptions firmly in place, debate then proceeds over whether legal
rules create the right amount of control over the protected subject
matter.
Call this the simple view of intellectual property rights. The sim-
ple view frames intellectual property in general, and patents in par-
ticular, as an exchange of information for protection. Inventors dis-
close the information comprising the invention in exchange for being
able to exclude others from using the information in certain ways,
such as reproducing the invention. On this view, inventors should be
loath to disclose any more information than necessary to obtain pat-
ent protection. Rational inventors should seek patent rights only when
the expected rents from the patent outweigh the expected costs of dis-
closing the information. Faced with an array of regimes by which to
protect their creations, rational inventors should choose the set of le-
gal rules that maximizes their exclusionary rights and minimizes the
amount and quality of information that must be revealed. If inventors
expect that a trade secret regime (which does not involve revealing
any information) will provide protection equal to or greater than pat-
ent rules (which require extensive revelation), then they should prefer
to keep the invention a trade secret. If a patent provides only poor
appropriability, it is likely to have little private value. Indeed, such a
patent may have a negative private value if the value of the informa-
tion revealed is greater than the rents the patent enables the inventor
to capture. If an inventor could reap the same rents regardless of
whether the invention was protected by a patent, then the inventor
should not deliberately disclose information and spend money obtain-
ing, defining, and enforcing patent rights. Thus, when inventors expect
that patents will be costly to obtain and ineffective in allowing them to
capture rents, we would not expect to see them demanding many pat-
ents.
And yet it is an undeniable fact that, when the value of intellec-
tual property rights is framed purely in terms of exclusivity and rents,
worthless patents abound.2 While the literature has devoted an enor-
1 See, for example, Graham v John Deere Co, 383 US 1, 9 (1965) (describing the patent
system as "a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge"); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv L Rev 4,21-22 (1984) (observing that
inventors would not make information public without the promise of compensation); Fritz
Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System, Study No 15, Subcommittee on Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong, 2d Sess 1, 21
(1958) (discussing the "exchange for secrets" theory of the patent system).
2 See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw U L Rev 1495,
1503-04 (2001) (presenting statistics on abandonment of issued patents); Robert P Merges, As
Many as Six Impossible Patents before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Pat-
ent System Reform, 14 Berkeley Tech L J 577, 603 (1999) ("[M]ost [patented] technologies will
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mous amount of time, paper, and ink to the discussion of whether le-
gal rules grant the optimal amount of exclusivity, it has not considered
whether it has been examining all the functions of patents. Are exclu-
sionary rights the only thing that makes intellectual property valu-
able? Might rational inventors ever find intellectual property protec-
tion valuable for reasons other than capturing rents and maximizing
control over the subject matter of the rights? Would rational actors
ever prefer a set of legal rules that they believe confers less protection
to a set of legal rules that they believe confers more protection? When
inventors reveal valuable information for little protection, are they
striking as bad a bargain as it may appear? As I will show in this Arti-
cle, such questions become easier to answer if we relax the assumption
that the private value of a patent is based solely on the ability to cap-
ture rents and exclude others from using the invention.
I challenge the traditional assumption that exclusivity is the alpha
and the omega of the private value of patent rights. To do so, I move
beyond the standard models that approach intellectual property as a
two-dimensional set of rights and rents. In the following Article, I will
build on the finance and corporate law literature to provide a new
general framework for analyzing the function and effect of intellectual
property rights. Rather than focusing on patents as a mechanism for
privatizing information, I will instead frame patents as a means of
credibly publicizing information. In the process, I will extend a simple
insight overlooked by previous theories of intellectual property: Own-
ers of intellectual property are usually actors in capital and labor mar-
kets as well as product markets. Patents can serve as a means of reduc-
ing informational asymmetries between patentees and observers. The
ability to convey information credibly to observers at low cost is a
highly valuable function of patents that has been completely over-
looked in the literature.
A richer understanding of the role of patents in reducing infor-
mation costs potentially has numerous practical and theoretical impli-
cations. Possession of a portfolio of intellectual property rights is an
attribute that is voluntary, under a firm's control, and readily measur-
able, at least along some margins. If an easily measurable firm attrib-
ute such as patent counts is positively correlated with other less read-
ily measurable firm attributes such as knowledge capital, then patent
counts can be used as a means of conveying information about these
other attributes. Knowing this, firms may choose to obtain and use a
not be economically viable or commercially successful."); Edmund W. Kitch, Property Rights in
Inventions Writings; and Marks, 13 Harv J L & Pub Pol 119,122-23 (1990) (arguing that "[t]he
claims of most issued patents are so narrow that competitors can devise many ways of achieving
the same thing as the subject matter of the claim," and that "most issued patents are worthless,
or very nearly worthless," having "no market value, much less market power").
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portfolio of patent rights to signal information about themselves that
would be more expensive to convey through other means. Alterna-
tively, firms can use the patent document itself to convey information
that would not be as credible when revealed in other contexts. Intel-
lectual property, therefore, derives value from more than just the enti-
tlement to exclude. Under some circumstances, the signal sent by the
patent may be more valuable to the rights holder than the substance
of the rights. When we broaden our focus and consider the function of
patents as a means of reducing information costs, patents that appear
to be worthless under traditional exclusivity-based conceptions of
value may turn out to have positive value after all.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I sets out the existing con-
ceptualization of the value of intellectual property rights and demon-
strates the awkwardness of its underlying assumptions. Part II supplies
a framework for analyzing intellectual property protection as some-
thing more than a package of incentives to create or control develop-
ment of an invention. Part III takes insights from the finance and cor-
porate law literature to demonstrate how patents can reduce informa-
tional asymmetries in capital markets, thereby potentially reducing in-
formation costs. This Part presents a model of patents as a signaling
mechanism and considers the multiple equilibria that could result
from using patents to convey information. It also discusses the poten-
tial ambiguities of patent signals. Part IV explores the implications of
a theory of patents as a means of reducing information asymmetries. It
considers how patents may reduce information costs along some mar-
gins but raise them along others. The Article concludes that intellec-
tual property rights can serve an informative function and suggests
that we need to explore further the ultimate efficiency of patents as
informational mechanisms.
I. THE SIMPLE VIEW OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. Of Rights and Rents
The image of property as a bundle of rights is a familiar one in
the literature. In this image, each right in the bundle represents a facet
of the relation between the rights holder and the rest of society over
the use and control of a scarce resource.3 The right to exclude others is
frequently described as the most important stick in the bundle of pri-
vate property rights." The implication of this model is that such rights
3 See Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, 22 Nomos 69,69 (1980) (describing
the modem view of property as a bundle of rights).
4 See, for example, Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons: Custom, Commerce, and
Inherently Public Property, 53 U Chi L Rev 711,711 (1986) ("The right to exclude others has of-
ten been cited as the most important characteristic of private property.").
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are valuable because they enable owners to say, as per Felix Cohen,
"Keep off X unless you have my permission, which I can grant or
withhold. Signed: Private citizen. Endorsed: The state."' This emphasis
on the exclusionary facet of property rules is nothing new. Blackstone
framed private property as exclusionary rights writ large, "that sole
and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the
external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe."6 Of course, Blackstone was overstating the
matter and he almost certainly knew if-but nonetheless, exclusion as
the essential benchmark of the value of private property rights has be-
come a powerful and persistent theme in the literature, so powerful
that it has been referred to as the "exclusivity axiom."6
When applied to intellectual property, the trope is no different.
Inventors give up information to the public domain (a loss to them) in
exchange for exclusive fights (compensation). On this view, inventors
should be loath to surrender any more information than absolutely
necessary to obtain patent protection, whereas legal rules should en-
sure that the protection received will be sufficient, on average, to
compensate for the value of the information disclosed. The private
value of a patent thus becomes framed in exclusivity terms.' Discus-
sion then proceeds as though inventors sought patents solely to gain
exclusive rights to a technology, and as if they only used those fights to
capture an income stream from the technology, block competitors, or
gain bargaining leverage with other market actors.
On this simple view, a patent's value is determined by the rents it
enables the patentee to capture (or prevent others from capturing) in
the relevant product market." For example, Louis Kaplow writes that
5 Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 Rutgers L Rev 357,374 (1954).
6 William Blackstone, 2 Commentaries on the Laws of England *2 (Chicago 1979). In all
fairness to Blackstone, he did appreciate the existence of property regimes, such as riparian
rights, that created limited appropriability over the subject matter of the rights. Id at *18. He also
discussed at some length various legal privileges trumping property rights. Id.
7 See Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 Yale L J 601,
630 (1998) ("Immediately after he made his sweeping and highly quotable assertion equating
property with exclusive dominion, Blackstone professed anxiety about the distributional founda-
tions of existing property rights.").
8 Id at 604.
9 See Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old Boundaries and New Frontiers, 76 Ind
L J 803,814 (2001) ("In exchange for a limited monopoly, the inventor has to disclose enough in-
formation about the patent so as to allow other individuals to build on the disclosures.").
10 See, for example, Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geo-
graphic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 NC L Rev 889,927-28 (2001) ("The value of a patent lies
in its guarantee of exclusivity, providing the patent owner a defined property right. This value
depends on the boundaries of the property right, competitors' respect for those boundaries, and
the ability of the patentee to enforce them.").
11 A complete recitation of the literature modeling intellectual property in terms of rents
and product markets would be impossible here. For a few of the many discussions of patents
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the value of a patent "depends upon a number of factors, including the
market value of the invention, the structure of the market involving
the patented process or product, and the attributes of the patentee
(such as marketing and production capacities) that determine its
range of options within that market."12 Or, in the words of Steven
Cheung, the value of a patent "must ultimately rest on some market-
able product actually or potentially to be generated under its provi-
sions.
1 3
On this view, if an inventor knows ex ante that she will be unable
to sell or license a patented invention, then she should not seek a pat-
ent. If the scope of a patent is very narrow, it is likely to have little
value. If demand for the patented invention is perfectly elastic or if a
market for the technology does not exist and the patentee is unable to
create one, then the patent is worthless. A patentee who is unwilling or
unable to enforce her property rights might as well not obtain them in
the first place. Once her has been granted a patent, no sane patentee
would choose to forgo her only opportunity to generate revenue from
it in excess of the costs of the transaction. Rational inventors will cal-
culate the technology's expected revenue stream ex ante and proceed
accordingly. Ian Ayres and Paul Klemperer illustrate this view nicely:
"The current patent system-which grants the patentee a monopoly
for a limited number of years- ... allows the patentee to capture a
rough and limited proxy of consumer value and then lets the potential
innovator decide whether the benefits of innovation justify the
costs.
14
purely in terms of rents and product markets, see Robert P Merges, Intellectual Property Rights
and the New Institutional Economics, 53 Vand L Rev 1857 (2000); Mark A. Lemley, The Econom-
ics ofImprovement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex L Rev 989 (1997); Robert P. Merges, Con-
tracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84
Cal L Rev 1293 (1996); Suzanne Scotchmer, Protecting Early Innovators: Should Second-
Generation Products Be Patentable?, 27 RAND J Econ 322 (1996); Kenneth W. Dam, The Eco-
nomic Underpinnings of Patent Law, 23 J Legal Stud 247 (1994); Richard Gilbert and Carl
Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J Econ 106 (1990); Paul Klemperer, How
Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be?, 21 RAND J Econ 113 (1990);F.M. Scherer, In-
dustrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 382-84 (Houghton Mifflin 3d ed 1990);
Jennifer F. Reinganum, The Timing of Innovation: Research, Development and Diffusion, in
Richard Schmalensee and Robert D. Willig, eds, 1 Handbook of Industrial Organization 849 (El-
sevier Science 1989); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust IntersectionA Reappraisal, 97 Harv L
Rev 1813 (1984); William D. Nordhaus, Invention, Growth, and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment
of Technological Change 70-86 (MIT 1969);William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation
of the Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 Yale L J 267 (1966); John S. McGee, Patent
Exploitation: Some Economic and Legal Problems, 9 J L & Econ 135 (1966); Kenneth J. Arrow,
Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in The Rate and Direction of
Inventive Activity 609 (Princeton 1962).
12 Kaplow, 97 Harv L Rev at 1823 (cited in note 11).
13 Steven N.S. Cheung, Property Rights and Invention, 8 Rsrch in L & Econ 5,13 (1986).
14 Ian Ayres and Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power Without Reducing In-
novation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, 97 Mich
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What, precisely, is that "rough and limited proxy of consumer
value" that legal rules ostensibly enable patentees to capture? As
Kenneth Dam describes it, "The economic rent received by the pat-
entee is, in the normal case, measured by the difference between the
patentee's per-unit costs and competitors' per-unit costs (to the extent
attributable to the patented innovation) multiplied by the patentee's
volume."'
Under the simple view, agents seek property rights to their inven-
tions because legal rules create scarcity in otherwise inappropriable
and nonrivalrous public goods. As a result of the public goods nature
of knowledge, elucidated by Kenneth Arrow in his classic theoretical
probe of market allocation of information," production and disclosure
of inventions in the absence of legal rules creates positive externalities
not capturable by the original information-producer.17 By creating
scarcity, legal rules allow for appropriability of information, thus al-
lowing inventors to internalize the positive externalities generated by
the information they release to the world.'8
L Rev 985,1008 (1999).
15 Dam, 23 J Legal Stud at 250 (cited in note 11). Schankerman and Pakes describe the
present (private) value of a single patent more formally as
7"*
V= Z (R, - C)(1 +
where R, - C, is the net revenue from holding the patent for time period t, i is the discount rate,
and T* is the optimal patent term. R, can be redefined as R,(1 - 6), where 8 is the appropriate
decay rate. Mark Schankerman and Ariel Pakes, Estimates of the Value of Patent Rights in Euro-
pean Countries During the Post-1950 Period, 96 Econ J 1052,1066 (1986). While such a model is
more useful than the norm in that it does not assume a zero-transaction-cost world and factors in
technological obsolescence, it nonetheless fails to contemplate that the value of a patent might
include any variables other than those generated by product markets.
16 This theory has been described exhaustively elsewhere and need only be recited briefly
here. See Arrow, Economic Welfare at 609 (cited in note 11) (examining the extent to which per-
fect competition leads to optimal allocation of resources). See also Lemley, 75 Tex L Rev at 993-
1000 (cited in note 11) (examining how the incentives of intellectual property law encourage the
production of public goods like information); Scherer, Industrial Market Structure at 379-99
(cited in note 11); Nordhaus, Invention, Growth, and Welfare at 70-90 (cited in note 11) (discuss-
ing the failure of a price system to generate new knowledge efficiently).
17 The existence and economic consequences of spillovers are well documented. See, for
example, Zvi Griliches, ed, R&D and Productivity: The Econometric Evidence 251-65 (Chicago
1998); Adam B. Jaffe, et al, Geographic Localization of Knowledge Spillovers as Evidenced by
Patent Citations, 108 Q J Econ 577, 577 (1993); Adam B. Jaffe, Technological Opportunity and
Spillovers of R&D: Evidence from Firms' Patents, Profits, and Market Value, 76 Am Econ Rev
984,984 (1986).
18 See Arrow, Economic Welfare at 615 (cited in note 11) ("[T]here is a fundamental para-
dox in the ... demand for information; its value for the purchaser is not known until he has the
information, but then he has in effect acquired it without cost."); Richard R. Nelson, The Simple
Economics of Basic Scientific Research, 67 J Polit Econ 297,300 (1959) (analyzing how private
market incentives affect the direction of research). See also Nordhaus, Invention, Growth, and
Welfare at 51-55 (cited in note 11) (measuring the significance of externalities in the production
of knowledge); Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am Econ Rev Papers
& Proceedings 347,348 (1967) (defining externalities).
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The result is that without legal protection, not enough information will
be produced; but with legal protection, not enough information will be
used. By redistributing consumer surplus to producers, patents are one
mechanism by which legal rules create appropriability.19
The simple view of patent rights is pervasive. In fact, it is difficult
to find a model or theory that describes the private benefits of patents
as based on anything other than the capture of rents in the relevant
product market for the technology or an improvement on the tech-
nology.20 "Defensive patenting" models, which hypothesize that firms
may obtain patents in order to raise costs for competitors, still treat
the value of a patent as stemming solely from rents and product mar-
kets. When Robert Merges states that "one-to-one mapping" between
patent rights and markets does not always exist-or, in other words,
that a technology may be protected by many patents and even by a
collection of patents, copyrights, and trademarks, no single one of
which covers the entire technology-he is still speaking in terms of the
relationship between intellectual property rights, rents, and product
19 See Dam, 23 J Legal Stud at 261 (cited in note 11) ("Economic rent is the price paid by
the patent system to deal with the appropriability problem.").
20 Theories that consider the value of patents as defensive mechanisms also rely on the
capture of rents (in this case, raising the cost to competitors of capturing rents or preventing cap-
ture outright) in the relevant market based on the patented technology. See, for example, Bron-
wyn H. Hall and Rosemarie Ham Ziedonis, The Patent Paradox Revisited.An Empirical Study of
Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-95, 32 RAND J Econ 101, 125 (2001). In a
strong form of the simple view, exclusionary rights and market power are conflated. Some courts
and commentators have gone so far as to assume that intellectual property rights automatically
confer market power. See, for example, Jefferson Parish Hospital District No 2 v Hyd 466 US 2,
16 (1984) (stating that "it is fair to presume" a patent gives the patentee market power); United
States v Loew's, Inc, 371 US 38,45 (1962) ("The requisite [market] power is presumed when the
tying product is patented or copyrighted."); Digidyne Corp v Data General Corp, 734 F2d 1336,
1344 (9th Cir 1984) (holding that a copyright "created a presumption of economic power suffi-
cient to render the tying arrangement illegal per se"). Legal rules in the form of intellectual
property rights usually do not confer market power in the economically relevant product market.
See Phillip Areeda and Louis Kaplow, Antitrust Analysis 441-42 (Little, Brown 4th ed 1988);
Herbert Hovenkamp, Economics and Federal Antitrust Law § 8.3 at 219-20 (West Lawyer's ed
1985). Nonetheless, the argument goes, the patent system seeks to grant market power. See Kap-
low, 97 Harv L Rev at 1817 (cited in note 11) ("[Tlhe very purpose of a patent grant is to reward
the patentee by limiting competition, in full recognition that monopolistic evils are the price so-
ciety will pay."). Many commentators recognize, however, that not all patents confer market
power. See, for example, Merges, 53 Vand L Rev at 1859 (cited in note 11) (noting the complex
relationship between patents and market power); Lemley, 75 Tex L Rev at 1000-08 (cited in note
11) (illustrating the small number of patents that are litigated or licensed). The error of the
strong form in assuming that patents confer market power has been discussed elsewhere. See
Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual
Property, 53 Vand L Rev 1727, 1729 (2000) (criticizing the assumption that intellectual property
rights confer an economic monopoly); Edmund W. Kitch, Patents: Monopolies or Property
Rights?, 8 Rsrch in L & Econ 31, 33 (1986) ("It is not clear that every owner of a patent has a
monopoly."); FM. Scherer, Comment on Edmund Kitch, 8 Rsrch in L & Econ 51, 51 (1986)




markets.2' Even challengers of the patent system assume that the pri-
vate value of a patent is based solely on exclusive rights and rents to
be captured in product markets."
B. The Implications of the Simple View
The simple view of patent rights has several implications. Under
Kenneth Arrow's classic formulation, control over the invention, or
"appropriability" as he calls it, drives the demand function for patents.
Arrovian inventors simply would not invent (or would keep their in-
ventions secret) in the absence of legal rules allowing the capture of
rents.23 It is the marginal agent who invents in the absence of appro-
priability. If patents were suddenly found to be a poor means of cap-
turing rents in a particular industry, we would expect the demand for
patents in that industry to decrease.
On the basis of the simple view, a substantial literature has grown
up that deals with the theoretical economics of patenting. Much of this
literature concludes that even in the presence of legal rules, inventors
will be under- rather than over-rewarded.4'This should not be con-
fused with the question of whether legal rules will under- or over-
induce inventive attempts.2 I want to focus on the private value of in-
tellectual property and abstract away, at least for now, from the social
costs and benefits of the intellectual property system.26
21 Merges, 53 Vand L Rev at 1859 (cited in note 11).
22 See, for example, Ayres and Klemperer, 97 Mich L Rev at 1008-12 (cited in note 14)
(suggesting that patents be enforced through liability rules); Steven Shavell and Tanguy van
Ypersele, Rewards versus Intellectual Property Rights *6-8, Working Paper No 6956 (NBER
1999), available online at <http://papersnber.org/papersfW6956/> (visited Mar 26,2002) (propos-
ing a system of state-sponsored cash rewards); Douglas Gary Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the
Government Should Subsidize the Purchase of Patented Pharmaceuticals, 11 Harv J L & Tech 123,
123-24 (1997) (recommending cash subsidies to lower drug costs); William Kingston, ed, Direct
Protection of Innovation 1-34 (Kluwer Academic 1987) (proposing to protect commercialization
efforts directly).
23 Arrow, Economic Welfare at 615 (cited in note 11) ("With suitable legal measures, in-
formation may become an appropriable commodity.").
24 See, for example, Arrow, Economic Welfare at 617 (cited in note 11) (stating that appro-
priability of information is incomplete); Nelson, 67 J Polit Econ at 297 (cited in note 18) (arguing
that insufficient resources are being allocated to research). For a somewhat critical view of Ar-
row's analysis, see Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J L &
Econ 1, 1 (1969). For an opposing view, see Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of In-
formation and the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 Am Econ Rev 561,571 (1971) (arguing that
overcompensation is possible).
25 Legal rules may overinduce invention if they create incentives for inventors to engage in
patent races or create duplicative research. See Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing ofInnovations, 50
Rev Econ and Stat 348,351-52 (1968).
26 Oh well, I can't resist. To the extent that the inducements of the patent system stimulate
discovery of valuable new inventions that otherwise would have been developed more slowly or
not at all, they increase social welfare. Of course, the social welfare benefits of inventive activity
must be offset against their social costs. The social costs of the patent system go beyond the di-
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The literature proposes two reasons for why the patent system
consistently under-rewards inventors. First, appropriability will be in-
complete and thus, even with patent protection, inventors will be able
to capture only some fraction of the benefits of their discoveries.z Per-
fect delineation and enforcement of rights will be impossible, and in-
ventors will be unable to appropriate the value of spillovers of their
ideas to other researchers. Even after inventors have obtained patents,
it is difficult to determine where the boundaries of the patents lie."
Measuring the attributes of patents can present high costs. Patents are
better at preventing duplication of the invention than securing royalty
income, an indication that the costs of evaluating a patent's attributes
rect costs of R&D and deadweight loss. For example, some research might be duplicative, re-
search efforts may be diverted away from socially beneficial but unpatentable research, second-
comers may be forced to invent around existing patents, or the rents capturable from legal rules
might be dissipated in the race to capture them. See, for example, Brian D. Wright, The Econom-
ics of Invention Incentives: Patents; Prizes, and Research Contracts, 73 Am Econ Rev 691,691-95
(1983) (discussing the "common pool" problem); Partha Dasgupta and Joseph Stiglitz, Industrial
Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity, 90 Econ J 266, 289 (1980) (noting the problem of
duplicative invention); Glenn C. Loury, Market Structure and Innovation, 93 Q J Econ 395, 407
(1979) (noting the problem of too many competitors); Barzel, 50 Rev Econ & Stat at 352 (cited
in note 25) (explaining patent races and rent dissipation); McGee, 9 J L & Econ at 137 (cited in
note 11) (discussing the diversion of research efforts into patentable fields); Dan Usher, The Wel-
fare Economics of Invention, 31 Economica 279,286 (1964) (discussing community decisions in
formulating incentives). Considerable attention has been devoted in the public choice literature
to the question of whether anticipated rents are totally dissipated by expenditures to capture
them. See, for example, Gordon Tullock, Efficient Rent Seeking, in Robert D. Tollison and Roger
D. Congleton, eds, The Economic Analysis of Rent Seeking 131 (Edward Elgar 1995). In the pat-
ent context, many commentators assume private actors are risk averse. Arrow, Economic Welfare
at 610-14 (cited in note 11). If rent-seekers are not risk-neutral, or if they are in asymmetric posi-
tions, or if rent seeking is not free, the total amount expended on rent-seeking may be either
more or less than the total rent. Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice 11232 (Cambridge 1989). But,
as I demonstrate later in this Article, patents can impose social costs independent of deadweight
loss. I abstract away from the merits of transferring wealth from consumers to inventors.
27 Some commentators have theorized the opposite-that the existence of multiple profit-
able uses for the same information may sufficiently reward inventors, even in the absence of
property rules. See, for example, Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valu-
able Information, 9 J Legal Stud 683,717-19 (1980); Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of
Public Goods, 13 J L & Econ 293, 306 (1970). For example, Jack Hirshleifer has proposed that
even in the absence of private property rights, inventors may receive adequate compensation for
putting the information surrounding the invention in the public domain if they could speculate
on price revaluations. Hirshleifer, 61 Am Econ Rev at 571 (cited in note 24). Hirshleifer posits
that if Eli Whitney had speculated on the increased demand for cotton that his invention
spurred, he could potentially have received much greater monetary rewards than he did under
his largely unsuccessful attempts to enforce his patent. Id at 570-71.
28 See Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights in cDNA Sequences: A New Resident for the
Public Domain, 3 U Chi Roundtable 575,576 (1996) ("[U]nfortunately, it is much more difficult
to define the scope of a patent than the boundaries of a parcel of land, the confines of a piece of
wood, or the body of a fox."). See also Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson, and John P Walsh,
Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why U.S. Manufacturing
Firms Patent (Or Not) *14-15, Working Paper No 7552 (NBER 2000), available online at
<http://papers.nber.org/papersW7552> (visited Mar 26,2002) (noting survey data indicating the
ease of inveting around is the most common reason not to patent).
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may be higher in some contexts than others.n I will return to the sig-
nificance of the evaluation cost of patents later in this Article. For now,
it is important to note that not all attributes of a patent will be readily
measurable. The difficulty of delineating the rights will decrease the
effectiveness of the patent as a means of excluding others and captur-
ing rents. Second, inventors cannot capture total consumer surplus. Al-
though in theory the deadweight loss associated with exclusivity can
be avoided by price discrimination, in practice the transaction costs of
price discrimination are likely to be high.n
Exclusivity unquestionably is an important aspect of private
property rights. Nonetheless, a view that defines the value of patent
rights solely in terms of the use and control of resources rests on an
impoverished understanding of the role patents can play. Recall that
traditional models of intellectual property rights frame patents as an
exchange of information for protection.3' A critical assumption under-
lies this view. Inventors are assumed to suffer losses when information
is made public, a loss exclusive rights attempt to compensate. Ift how-
ever, we relax this assumption-either by exploring the hypothesis
that inventors may in some circumstances benefit from publicizing the
information surrounding the invention, or by asking whether compen-
sation may include factors in addition to a grant of exclusive rights-
then a more accurate understanding of the function of patents
emerges. If inventors might gain from publicizing information in a
patent, then they may choose to seek patent protection, even if the an-
ticipated value of the exclusive rights received in return were zero.
Similarly, if the grant of a patent confers benefits on patentees in addi-
tion to exclusive rights, then rational actors might seek patents in or-
der to capture this other, non-product market benefit. Finally, if the
private value of a patent includes variables in addition to those con-
sidered by the simple view, then we need to reconsider the simple
view's implication that legal rules tend to under-reward invention be-
cause appropriability is imperfect. Perhaps instead inventors may be
adequately or even super-rewarded for publicizing information in a
patent document, even if the exclusionary rights granted are limited.
29 Richard C. Levin, et a, Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Devel-
opment, 3 Brookings Papers on Econ Activity 783,795 (1987).
30 See Demsetz, 13 J L & Econ at 296 (cited in note 27) (stating that price discrimination is
inefficient for private goods). For a discussion of the social desirability of price discrimination by
patent holders and the relationship between price discrimination and the optimal length of a
patent, see Jerry A. Hausman and Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, Price Discrimination and Patent
Policy, 19 RAND J Econ 253, 264-65 (1988) (arguing that price discrimination with scale
economies can lead to Pareto improvements).
31 See note 1 and accompanying text.
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II. TRANSCENDING THE SIMPLE VIEW
In this Part, I present a new general framework by which to ana-
lyze the function and effect of patent rules. Rather than conceptualiz-
ing patent law as a set of legal rules that allows individuals to privatize
what would otherwise be dissipated in the public domain, I will in-
stead consider patents as a means of credibly publicizing information.
In the balance of this Article, I will explore the hypothesis that firms
may obtain patents for reasons other than capturing rents in product
markets. Specifically, I will consider that patents may serve as a means
of reducing informational asymmetries between patentees and ob-
servers.
Recall that the simple view treats patent protection as an ex-
change of information for protection. On this view, rational actors
should be loath to surrender information about their inventions with-
out receiving the corresponding benefit of exclusionary rights. Let us
relax this assumption. Pace the simple view, let us explore the hy-
pothesis that the patentee may desire information disclosure, even if
the value of the exclusive rights (protection) obtained in exchange is
zero. This could occur if information disclosure generates its own
benefits, or if part of the private value of patents comes from sources
other than rents captured in product markets.
The information that observers can glean from a patent or portfo-
lio of patents can be analyzed along several margins. By obtaining a
patent, firms can credibly convey information about the invention to
observers who otherwise might not be willing to expend the costs nec-
essary to obtain the information. (Because more than 80 percent of
the patents granted in the United States are assigned to corporations,
I will speak of patentees and firms interchangeably.2) Patents are
readily available public documents that present low acquisition costs
for observers.33 Based on the information contained in the patent, ob-
servers may conclude that the invention will increase the expected
value of the firm-even if it is not the existence of patent protection
that makes the invention valuable-and invest accordingly.3 Because
32 See John R. Allison and Mark A. Lemley, Who's Patenting What?:An Empirical Explo-
ration of Patent Prosecution, 53 Vand L Rev 2099,2101 (2000). Only individuals-not corpora-
tions-may be inventors. See 35 USC § 115 (1994); 37 CFR § 1.41(a) (2001). Firms come to be
the primary holders of patents because many firms as a condition of employment require em-
ployees to assign any patent rights obtained while employed with the firm. Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research: Conflicts on Authorship, Ownership, and Accountability, 53
Vand L Rev 1161,1212 (2000).
33 Patents are published upon issue. The text of patents is available at the Patent and
Trademark Office's website. See <http://www.uspto.gov/patftlindex.html> (visited Mar 26, 2002).
34 For example, competitive advantages may be due to non-patent factors regarding the in-
vention, such as being a first-mover in the industry. If an invention will quickly become obsolete
and will be expensive to produce in commercially viable quantities, copying may not be worth-
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the penalties for intentionally misrepresenting material information in
a patent are severe, observers know that the information contained in
a patent has some credibility"
In addition to informing observers about the invention, patents
can inform observers about attributes of the patentee. If patents are
correlated with less readily observable firm characteristics, patents can
serve as a signal of firm quality. By acting as a signal, possession of in-
tellectual property may reduce the cost of communicating private in-
formation to the market regarding the financial prospects of the firm.
If observers in capital markets believe that patents convey significant
information about a firm that makes the firm a more attractive in-
vestment opportunity, firms may choose to experience losses in prod-
uct markets in order to capture gains in capital markets. By conveying
information to observers in a controlled and credible way, patents can
have positive private value to firms, even if the exclusive rights con-
veyed by the patent cost more to obtain than they enable the patentee
to capture in product market rents.
I want to make clear at the outset what I am not arguing. First, I
am not arguing that the right to exclude is not a valuable stick in the
proverbial bundle of intellectual property rights. Rather, I contend
that focusing on exclusivity and measuring value in terms of rents and
product markets presents an incomplete picture of the value and func-
tion of patents. Second, I do not maintain that conceptualizing patents
as an exchange of information for protection is unhelpful. Instead, it is
just one way to think about the patent system. Because the simple
view relies on the assumption that disclosing information represents a
loss to the patentee, however, it fails to contemplate that patentees
might actually benefit from the information disclosure, even if they
were to receive no protection in return.
To explore the value of patents as informational mechanisms,
consider a firm that has an invention. The firm must decide whether to
seek patent protection, rely on trade secret protection, or forgo intel-
lectual property protection altogether on the bundle of information.
The theory underlying trade secret protection is that an information
holder is allowed to keep secret the information it has acquired. 1 Be-
cause patent protection requires complete disclosure of the informa-
while, even if it is not protected by a patent. This innovation profile is frequently used to describe
advances in the semiconductor and information technology industries. See, for example, Hall and
Ziedonis, 32 RAND J Econ at 102 (cited in note 20) (semiconductors).
35 See text accompanying notes 64-70 for a discussion of the verification costs of a patent
and the penalties for material misrepresentations made by patentees.
3 See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 comment a (1995) ("Liability for
the appropriation of a trade secret thus rests on a breach of confidence or other wrongful con-
duct in acquiring, using, or disclosing secret information.").
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tion surrounding the invention, whereas trade secret protection man-
dates the opposite, obtaining patent protection will preclude reliance
on trade secret protection. Treating the invention as a trade secret will
quickly preclude patent protection." Forgoing intellectual property
protection altogether will quickly become an irrevocable decision,
thereby permanently barring both patent and trade secret protection.n
We would predict, under an economic approach to property rights,
that the firm would seek and refine intellectual property rights to the
invention only when they are cost effective, and that the process of de-
fining and enforcing property rights will proceed up to the point at
which marginal benefit equals marginal cost.39 Thus, when determining
whether to obtain, define, and enforce patent or trade secret rights, the
firm should examine whether the expected benefits of each regime
exceed the expected costs.
The value of a trade secret, V, is the expected product market
rents over the lifetime of the trade secret, r, that would not be cap-
tured but for the fact that the information has been kept secret; plus
the value of the undisclosed information itself, u; minus the costs, d, of
obtaining (c,'), defining (cd), and enforcing (ce') the rights in a trade se-
cret regime. u and r' are two different variables because keeping the
information comprising the invention undisclosed may have benefits
(such as competitive advantages) separable from the rents to be de-
rived from the invention itself. The value of a trade secret can thus be
represented as:
(1) V=r+u-(Co'+C, +Co.
Expected rents include not just the profits that would not be gar-
nered but for the fact that the information has been kept undisclosed,
37 Under 35 USC § 102(b) (1994), inventors must either file for patent protection within a
year of publicly using the invention or forgo patent protection altogether. Thus, if an inventor
treats his or her invention as a trade secret for more than one year before filing a patent applica-
tion, he or she will be precluded from obtaining patent protection. See, for example, D.L. Auld
Co v Chroma Graphics Corp, 714 F2d 1144,1148 (Fed Cir 1983) (finding that the sale of a prod-
uct whose method was kept secret barred the inventor from patenting the method after one
year). Even secret use of an invention by an inventor counts as "public use" against the inventor
for purposes of § 102(b). See, for example, Metallizing Engineering Co v Kenyon Bearing & Auto
Parts, Co, 153 F2d 516, 520 (2d Cir 1946) (finding that the use of a product to gain competitive
advantage qualified as public use).
38 A firm that fails to treat its invention as a trade secret cannot later claim trade secret
protection for that invention. See Uniform Trade Secrets Act § 1(4), 14 ULA 438 (1990) (defini-
tion of a trade secret).
39 For the economic view of property rights generally, see Armen A. Alchian, Economic
Forces at Work.- Selected Works by Armen A. Alchian 127-49 (Liberty 1977); Demsetz, 57 Am
Econ Rev Papers & Proceedings at 350-53 (cited in note 18) (discussing the emergence of prop-
erty rights); Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J L & Econ
11, 11 (1964) (analyzing resource allocation and property rights).
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but also licensing revenues from selling or licensing the trade secret.40
Trade secret holders are protected only against misappropriation of
the information by others, but not against independent discovery or
reverse-engineering.4' Because trade secret protection does not in-
volve a grant of rights by the state, the cost of obtaining trade secret
rights is zero.2 The costs of obtaining or transferring trade secret rights
will be positive when the original trade secret holder licenses or sells it
to another. Although the costs of defining and enforcing trade secret
protection are often treated in the literature as if they were zero, such
costs are positive because the information holder must take affirma-
tive steps to determine what information comprises the trade secret
and keep that information secret. For the sake of simplicity, however, I
will assume that the costs of defining and enforcing trade secret pro-
tection are zero.43 Thus (1) simplifies to:
(2) V = rt + u.
Let us now consider the value of patent protection. Under the
simple view, the value of a patent is the expected rents over the life-
time of the patent, r?, that would not be captured but for the existence
of patent rights, minus the costs, c", of obtaining (cof), defining (cj'),
and enforcing (cP') the rights in a patent regime, minus the opportunity
costs of making the information public (that is, forgoing trade secret
protection). Extrapolating from (2), this can be represented as:
(3) =? -(cf +C' +c,")-/-u.
I am including in my definition of r not just "but-for" profits, but
also licensing revenues and the benefits of using the patent as a defen-
sive mechanism against competitors. The costs of defining and enforc-
ing patent rights will be positive, as will the costs of obtaining the
rights-in contrast to a trade secret regime."
40 A trade secret holder may license the trade secret and still retain trade secret protection,
so long as the trade secret holder requires the licensee to continue to treat the information as a
trade secret. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 41.
41 Kewanee Oil Co v Bicron Corp, 416 US 470,476 (6th Cir 1974) ("A trade secret law...
does not offer protection against discovery by fair and honest means.").
42 I do not include the R&D costs of deriving the trade secret in the costs of obtaining
trade secret rights.
43 Even if I assumed the costs of trade secret protection were positive, the outcome would
not change. If anything, the theme of this article-that patents can be valuable because they
lower information costs-is reinforced by positive trade secret costs.
44 Conservative estimates peg the administrative costs of obtaining an average U.S. patent
at $20,000. See, for example, Lemley, 95 Nw U L Rev at 1498-99 (cited in note 2) (estimating
$20,000 as a "conservative average" cost of prosecution costs); Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving
Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J Small & Emerging Bus L 137,138 n 3 (2000) (estimating
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Now suppose patenting the firm's invention is "worthless" or at
least less valuable (under the simple view) than trade secret protec-
tion, that is, when V 0 or V! < V. Put another way, suppose the ex-
pected rents attributable to patent protection are less than the costs of
obtaining, defining, and enforcing those rights, plus the costs r' and u
of making the information public, such that
(4) r, < d'+r,+ u.
The expected costs, c' + r+ u (remember, we are still under the
simple view), could exceed the expected rents r for any number of
reasons. Perhaps even with the patentee's best efforts to draft the
document as clearly as possible, considerable costs would have to be
incurred to define and enforce the boundaries of the patent, in which
case c' is large. It might be that any patent issued on the invention
would be exceptionally narrow because the field is crowded and thus
r' is small. Or technology might become obsolete so quickly that the
firm would not find it worthwhile to defend the patent if it were in-
fringed. Focusing on factors that influence 7', suppose that competitors
would not copy the invention even if it were unprotected. Perhaps this
is because copying the invention is costly. Empirical studies have
found that the sheer cost of copying an invention-rather than protec-
tion conferred by legal rules-serves as one of the greatest deterrents
to copying.41 Eighty-five percent of the industries surveyed in empiri-
cal studies stated that the costs of imitating an unprotected invention
were more than half the original innovator's costs.4' Copying may be
costly because by the time copyists can retool their production lines,
the invention will be obsolete. Or the invention may be difficult to re-
verse-engineer, in which case u is large. If the invention is expensive to
produce in commercially viable quantities even in the absence of legal
protection, competitors may be deterred from copying. Finally,
an average of $25,000 in prosecution costs through issuance); Wayne M. Kennard, Software Pat-
ents and the Internet, 610 PLI/Pat 311, 325-26 (2000) (estimating average costs of $20,000 to
$50,000 to obtain a software patent); Vincent P. Tassinari, Patenting Gaming Methods for Internet
Use:A Managerial Imperative, 8 Nev L 10, 11 (June 2000) (estimating costs of $6,400 to $30,300
to obtain a patent); American Intellectual Property Law Association, Cradle to Grave Costs for a
U.S. Patent, AIPLA Bulletin 446 (Mar-Apr 1996) (estimating the costs of prosecuting a noncom-
plex patent to range from $14,420 to $23,540). Patent prosecution costs vary based on the size of
the entity, the number of claims, the complexity of the subject matter, and the time to disposition.
45 Levin, et al, 3 Brookings Papers on Econ Activity at 809 (cited in note 29) (illustrating
how patents raise imitation costs for products and processes).
46 Id (stating that 109 out of 127 industries surveyed, or 85.8 percent, calculated the cost of
duplicating a "major unpatented new product" in the industry as more than 50 percent of the in-
novator's development cost; when the innovation was a "major unpatented new process," that
number rose to 112 out of 127 industries, or 88.2 percent).
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competitors may forgo copying if competitive advantages in the indus-
try are due to non-patent factors such as being a first mover.
Would a firm ever seek patent protection under such circum-
stances?" Under the simple view, we would expect rational actors to
choose trade secret protection or no protection. It appears that under
these conditions obtaining (not to mention defining and enforcing)
patent rights presents positive costs but few offsetting benefits. Even if
the costs of patent rights in (4) were zero, trade secret protection
would still seem a better option than patent protection. If the product
market rents to be obtained under either regime were equal, a trade
secret regime would appear preferable so long as keeping the infor-
mation secret would yield competitive advantages (that is, when u is
positive).' Finally, if an invention would capture the same rents
whether it was protected by a patent or left unprotected, then-at
least under the simple view-what would be the point of patent pro-
tection? Similarly, if the expected but-for rents under a patent or trade
secret regime were zero, why bother to seek protection under any set
of legal rules? What additional benefits does a firm get from obtaining
intellectual property rights at all? Under these circumstances, on the
simple view, we would expect rational actors to forgo protection.
If, however, the value of a patent is composed of additional vari-
ables that the simple view does not consider, then it may be rational to
seek patent rights even when the expected cost of the rights is greater
than the expected but-for rents. Let us consider the ability of patents
to reduce informational asymmetries between patentees and observ-
ers as such a variable. I will call this the signaling value of a patent. (I
specifically confine myself to considering ways in which patents can
reduce information costs in capital markets, although they can be used
to reduce information costs in other contexts as well, such as labor
markets.49) If we include a patent's signaling value as a variable in the
overall value of patent rights we can recast (3) as
47 The innovation profile I have presented here is frequently used to describe advances in.
the semiconductor and information technology industries. See, for example, Hall and Ziedonis,
32 RAND J Econ at 102 (cited in note 20) (semiconductors).
48 When the invention is difficult to reverse-engineer, trade secret protection would indeed
appear to create the greatest potential for s to be positive, where s is the expected net value to
the patentee of conveying information in the patent document.
49 Patents may convey information about firms to existing or potential employees. They
can also convey information about employees to employers. For example, firms frequently use
patents to measure employee productivity and quality. If the number of patents an employee ob-
tains (an easily measurable attribute) is truly correlated with employee productivity or quality
(less easily measurable attributes) then patents could serve as a means of reducing information
costs between employees and employers. Such incentives, however, may produce inefficient out-
comes. Employees may reallocate resources away from productive activity and into patenting in
an attempt to appear productive and influence the employer's opinion of their quality. The result
is that the employee's attempts to influence the employer result in increased costs to the em-
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(5) V = T-c'-r-u +s,
where s is the expected net value, to the patentee, of conveying
information in the patent document. In practical terms, the signaling
value to the patentee may be the extra capital it is able to raise in
capital markets because of the information conveyed by the patent. I
model s and u as separate variables because disclosing information in
a patent may simultaneously present patentees with costs and benefits
in different arenas. Patentees may experience losses from disclosing
the information (u) for the traditional reasons assumed by the simple
view: because the patent contains all the information necessary to
reproduce the invention, competitors may now be in a position to
design the next generation of products. Because the gain (loss) due to
signaling occurs outside of product markets, I have assigned it a
different variable.
We can now see why firms might choose to seek patents, even
when we would not expect them to under the simple view. When the
patent's expected signaling value is high, it may be worthwhile to seek
patent protection, even if the expected but-for rents are negligible or
the expected costs large. Even if r is zero (such as when the invention
will capture the same product market rents regardless of whether it is
under patent protection), the expected costs, c' + r + u, may be offset
by s. This might explain why industries in which competitive advan-
tage in product markets is often derived from being a first mover, such
as semiconductors and information technology, are nonetheless
among the industries in which patenting is most popular/ This might
also explain why small firms, which usually face greater informational
asymmetries in capital markets than large firms, tend to patent more
intensely than large firms, even though they tend to enforce their pat-
ents less.1 Finally, it could help us understand why start-ups and firms
ployer, both in terms of the employee's decreased productivity, and from the self-serving nature
of the information the employee provides the employer. For a general discussion, see Paul Mil-
grom and John Roberts, An Economic Approach to Influence Activities in Organizations, 94 Am
J Soc S154 (1988) (explaining "influence activities").
50 The information technology, semiconductor, and computer industries report that most
patents in the field are ineffective or poorly effective at capturing rents and excluding competi-
tors in product markets. See James Bessen and Eric Maskin, Sequential Innovation, Patents and
Imitation *1 n 2, Working Paper No 00-01 (MIT Dept of Econ 2000), available online at
<http://www.researchoninnovation.org/patent.pdf> (visited Mar 26, 2002). See also Hall and
Ziedonis, 32 RAND J Econ at 125 (cited in note 20); Levin, et al, 3 Brookings Papers on Econ
Activity at 797 (cited in note 29). Still, the top ten patentees (by volume) in the U.S. in 2000 were
IBM, NEC, Canon, Samsung, Lucent, Sony, Micron, Toshiba, Motorola, and Fujitsu. See The
Corporate Patent Scorecard, Intel Prop Today 30 (July 2001).




that are not publicly traded are even more eager to patent than are es-
tablished firms.2
Let us reconsider the simple view's assumption that a patent is
"worthless," or at least less valuable, than trade secret protection
when the but-for rents are less than the costs of obtaining the rights
and making the information public. Recall that we expect firms to
seek and refine patent rights up to the point at which the marginal
benefit from doing so equals the marginal cost. The signaling value of
a patent, in addition to but-for rents, is a variable that comprises mar-
ginal benefit. Taking the value of reducing informational asymmetries
into account, patent protection becomes a net loss, or at least worth
less than trade secret protection when
(6) r1+s< C+r t +u.
Clearly, for patent protection not to be worth seeking, the ex-
pected but-for rents and the expected signaling value must add up to
less than the costs of patenting plus the opportunity costs of forgoing
trade secret protection. Only when the patent signaling value of the
patent is less than or equal to zero will the simple view's assumption
that disclosure must harm the patentee be accurate. (Note that the
signaling value of a patent is negative if observers would be inclined
to think worse of a patentee based on the information conveyed by a
patent than they would in the absence of the information.) Let us now
consider when the signaling value of a patent or portfolio might be
positive, how patents can reduce informational asymmetries between
firms and observers, and what kinds of information can be conveyed
through patents.
Ill. PATENT SIGNALS AND INFORMATION COSTS
In this Part, I examine patents in the broader economic sense of
informational mechanisms rather than in the narrow sense of a regime
of legal rules attempting to create exclusive rights to inventions. Pos-
session of a patent is a voluntary, readily observable, and verifiable at-
tribute of a firm. I first present a testable hypothesis that patents (and
by extension, patent portfolios) could reduce information asymme-
tries by directly conveying information about the invention and the
firm at low cost and by serving as a signal of firm attributes that are
52 Hall and Ziedonis, 32 RAND J Econ at 104 (cited in note 20). See also Zvi Griliches,
Ariel Pakes, and Bronwyn H. Hall, The Value of Patents as Indicators of Inventive Activity, in Par-
tha Dasgupta and Paul Stoneman, eds, Economic Policy and Technological Performance 97,100
(Cambridge 1987) (showing that smaller firms patent more intensively per dollar of R&D);'
Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 Mgmt Sci 173, 176 (1986)
(same).
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deemed positive by observers. Along quantity margins, if observers
correlate possession of patents with less readily measurable but none-
theless desirable attributes of the firm, then patents may be a useful
means of conveying information from firms to observers. Along qual-
ity margins, because patentees implicitly warrant the truth of the
statements contained in a patent, patents may have value if they are a
credible way of conveying information that observers would find ex-
pensive to verify. Next, I model how obtaining patents could constitute
a signal that sorts senders by type (high-quality versus low-quality). I
demonstrate that there is a reasonable concept of a signaling equilib-
rium if patenting is an activity that high-quality senders will find easier
to undertake. I show, however, that multiple equilibria are possible.
Finally, I consider various factors that could render such a patent sig-
nal ambiguous, such as inaccurate signals, ill-informed signalers and
observers, and incomplete information flows.
A. Patents and Information Asymmetries
In a world of perfect information, investors would be certain
about the payoffs from investing in any given firm. When information
is imperfect, by contrast, the value of a firm is ambiguous. Firms have
many attributes that vary from one firm to another. Investors will not
be privy to all of a firm's private information existing at the time they
are considering investing in the firm. Measuring these qualities will be
too costly to be done comprehensively. Instead, investors will measure
the firm's attributes up to the point where the marginal benefit of do-
ing so equals the marginal cost. In the presence of positive informa-
tion costs, investors will find that some of the attributes of the firm are
too costly to measure relative to their value. Under such conditions,
investors may undervalue some firms and overvalue others. Invest-
ments that might otherwise be attractive may be forsaken because of
these positive information costs.3 Investors have an incentive to
minimize information costs.
Firms, too, have an incentive to minimize information costs. To
the extent firms are undervalued as a result of investors' unwillingness
to increase marginal evaluation efforts, firms will find informational
imperfections costly. The strategy of firms will thus be to convey in-
formation about their positive attributes in a way that presents low
acquisition and verification costs to the intended recipients. If the cost
to the investors of receiving, deciphering, and verifying the informa-
tion is high, we can expect that few intended recipients will bother to
obtain it. The firm could remain underfunded and inefficiently priced,
53 For a general discussion, see Yoram Barzel, Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of In-
formation Costs, 20 J L & Econ 291,291-92 (1977).
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in which case it might not realize an adequate return on its research
projects. Firms can therefore be expected to attempt to reduce infor-
mational asymmetries that affect the cost of capital.
It is more efficient to allocate information cost-reducing activities
to firms than to investors. If firms are able to measure and convey in-
formation about their attributes, the measurement will occur exactly
once. On the other hand, if investors conduct the measurement, at-
tributes will be measured at least once; if there is more than one inves-
tor, chances are the attributes will be measured more than once. Al-
though both investors and firms have an incentive to reduce informa-
tional asymmetries, firms are more efficient at doing so, even when
firms' production costs are higher than investors' acquisition costs.n' It
is useless for the firm to convey information if investors would have to
spend too many resources deciphering it. In the words of Herbert
Simon, "a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention."" We
can therefore expect publicly held firms to minimize information costs
to the extent feasible. Similarly, start-up firms face the same sets of in-
centives to minimize information costs, even if they deal with a differ-
ent set of investors.
One strategy firms can use to convey information about attrib-
utes that are not easily discernible is signaling. A signal in this context
is just a variable with low measurement costs that observers believe is
not independently distributed relative to variables presenting high
measurement costs. To see why this is so, consider that at any moment,
an observer (such as an investor) possesses a probability distribution,
over possible values, of some variables of interest to it (such as the at-
tributes of a firm). Let us assume that these variables remain unmeas-
ured because measurement costs are high. The distribution of these
unmeasured variables can be informed by the existence of an ob-
served variable. This observed variable is the signal. If the observer
believes that the signal and the unobserved variables are not inde-
pendently distributed, the observer's distribution of the unobserved
variables will change upon receipt of the signal. A signal, then, is any
piece of information capable of altering an observer's probability dis-
tribution of unobserved variables. Signals, therefore, can have positive
value that makes them worth acquiring and transmitting, so long as
54 For discussions of which party in a transaction will incur measurement costs, see, for ex-
ample, Roy W. Kenney and Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Block Booking, 26 J L & Econ
497,539-40 (1983) (discussing block booking as a way of preventing consumer measurement);
Yoram Barzel, Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets, 25 J L & Econ 27,48 (1982)
(discussing measurement costs and their effects on market structure).
55 Herbert A. Simon, Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich World, in Martin
Greenberger, ed, Computers; Communication.L and the Public Interest 37, 40 (Johns Hopkins
1971).
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the signal and the unmeasured variables are not independently dis-
tributed.
Intellectual property can serve as a signal of less readily measur-
able attributes. For example, straight patent counts present low meas-
urement costs to observers, and there is little doubt that capital mar-
kets believe patents to be correlated with various firm characteristics.56
Suppose investors prefer firms with higher R&D output to those with
lower R&D output because they expect R&D output will be corre-
lated with the future value of the firm. If investors believe the quantity
of patents obtained by a firm in a time period (an easily measurable
variable) is a measure of R&D output in that time period (a less easily
measurable variable), then investors may take the firm's patent rate
into account when attempting to extrapolate the future value of the
firm.
Of course, if firms perceived that the existence of asymmetric in-
formation gave them an advantage, whether in product markets or
capital markets, the firm could make the cost of acquisition of the in-
formation by a recipient high. The information would not be made
public at all, or if it were, its sale price would be quite high. In the in-
tellectual property context, when a firm chooses trade secret protec-
tion over patent protection, along some margins at least it has decided
that the benefit of revealing the information (whether to capital mar-
kets or to product markets) is lower than the cost. The firm may an-
nounce that it has a trade secret, but such announcements will usually
be unverifiable. To the extent such an announcement is verifiable, the
verifiability is conferred by reputation. The market may respond to
the high cost of the information by attempting to get it through means
other than buying it, such as investigation of the firm's behavior or in-
dustrial espionage, or the market may not attempt to obtain the in-
formation at all.
What information do the alterable and unalterable aspects of a
firm's patent portfolio convey? Individual patents and patent portfo-
lios can signal many things. Individual patents can convey information
directly and credibly about the invention. Patent portfolios can convey
information about the lines of research a firm is conducting and how
quickly the research is proceeding. The quantity and quality of the
patents in the portfolio can serve as a signal of other firm attributes, as
can the order in which the firm applies for the patents. A full consid-
eration of all the information a patent could convey and all the ways it
could do so is beyond the scope of this Article, but I discuss some of
the ways in which patents can convey information below.
56 See, for example, Lemley, 95 Nw U L Rev at 1505-06 (cited in note 2) (noting that ven-
ture capitalists correlate patent applications with good company management).
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1. Patents and portfolios can convey information about the
invention and the firm.
In the most straightforward instance, obtaining a patent on an in-
vention communicates information about the invention to the public
at low cost. Individual patents can contain a wealth of otherwise unob-
tainable information about the invention and are often quite lengthy.
A patent has two parts: the specification and the claims. The claims,
which appear at the end, describe the scope of the invention. In the
specification, which is the body of the patent document, the patentee
must describe the invention in detail. This includes explaining how to
make and use the invention, the best way to do so, how the invention
is different from others in the field (the prior art), the problems the
inventor faced, and the steps he or she took to solve them.5
Readers can often discover such tidbits as what kinds of experi-
ments the patentee conducted in the course of testing the invention,
what the experimental results were, and what complementary prod-
ucts (often mentioned by brand name) the patentee recommends for
use with the invention. For example, Hewlett-Packard recommends
Microsoft products.n In the section in which the patentee describes
how the invention differs from the prior art, patentees have the op-
portunity to criticize competing products. Sometimes they choose to
do so by name and in scathing terms. Sun Microsystems, for one, is not
above trashing the competition.59 Such information can provide a win-
dow into a firm's R&D, indicate which of its competitors' products it
is directly competing with, and inform observers of the existence of
aspects of an invention they would not otherwise know about. Be-
cause patents can serve an advertising function, they have value in ad-
dition to any protection conferred by the existence of legal rules. Even
if patents conferred no protection, firms might find it desirable to ob-
tain them as a means of credibly advertising their inventions.
57 The first paragraph of 35 USC § 112 (1994) reads:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner
and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable
any person skilled in the art to which it pertains ... to make and use the same, and shall set
forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
58 See David RP. Taylor, et al, System and Method for a Communication System, U.S. Pat-
ent No 6,147,773 (Nov 14,2000) (recommending Microsoft Windows as the operating system).
Hewlett-Packard and Microsoft have been part of several industry working groups and strategic
alliances over the years.
59 In a patent assigned to Sun Microsystems, the patentee (an employee of Sun) refers to
Intel's competing product as an "intellectual curiosity." Brian Berliner, Method for Creating a
Single Binary Virtual Device Driver for a Windowing Operating System, U.S. Patent No 6,269,408
(July 31,2001), available online at <http:lswpat.ffii.orglvrejilpiktatxtep/0805/399/#applil> (vis-
ited Mar 26,2002).
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Portfolios can indicate what lines of research the firm is
undertaking and what the firm does and doesn't consider valuable,
outline a research trajectory that adumbrates fields the firm may be
branching into next, disclose how fast the firm is proceeding within a
particular area of research, and reveal other valuable dynamic
information. Jerome Lemelson, for example, became quite rich
anticipating managerial decisions based on a close study of firms'
patents. By carefully analyzing-among other things-the succession
of patents a firm or industry received over time, Lemelson would
attempt to deduce the research a firm or industry would conduct next
and what product lines it might create or expand into. He would then
write patents directly in the path of the firm's or industry's progress
and demand to be bought off. The strategy paid handsomely. 1 Prior
to Lemelson's success, firms had been concerned about not revealing
trade secrets in patent applications. It came as a surprise to them to
discover they had not gone nearly far enough: nobody had realized
that information about aspects of the firm not directly related to the
firm's inventions could be deduced from a study of patent portfolios.
If nothing else, patents may reveal information about the firm
simply because they are costly. Under numerous explorations in sig-
naling theory, parties signal positive attributes by engaging in costly
behavior that parties without positive attributes would find hard to
mimic.?2 Just as a firm may use conspicuous consumption of advertis-
60 One of Lemelson's former attorneys, Arthur Lieberman, believes Lemelson deduced
many of the inventions he claimed in his patents from reading other patents. Nicholas Varchaver,
The Patent King, Fortune 203 (May 14,2001) (quoting Lieberman as saying, "In many cases, Le-
melson didn't patent inventions,... [h]e invented patents.").
61 Lemelson's patents are estimated to reap nearly $1.5 billion per year in licensing fees.
Warren Strugatch, From Two Patent Lawsuits, Many Reverberations, NY Tunes § 14LI at 6 (May
13,2001).
62 See, for example, Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms 18-27 (Harvard 2000) (explain-
ing how costly signals distinguish good from bad types); Robert Gertner, Robert Gibbons, and
David Scharfstein, Simultaneous Signalling to the Capital and Product Markets, 19 RAND J Econ
173,173-74 (1988) (observing that dividends can serve as a signal of expected cash flows); Rama-
sastry Ambarish, Kose John, and Joseph Williams, Efficient Signalling with Dividends and In-
vestments, 42 J Fin 321,321 (1987) (stating that willingness to pass up net present value invest-
ment opportunities in order to increase dividend payout-a costly activity-signals firm quality);
Paul Asquith and David W. Mullins, Jr., Signalling with Dividend!; Stock Repurchases; and Equity
Issues, 15 Fin Mgmt 27, 35, 41-42 (1986) (noting that increases or decreases in dividends or an
equity issue act as a signal); Sudipto Bhattacharya, Imperfect Information, Dividend Policy, and
"The Bird in the Hand" Fallacy, 10 Bell J Econ 259,260 (1979) (noting that dividends can serve
as a signal of expected cash flows); Nicholas J. Gonedes, Corporate Signaling, External Account-
ing, and Capital Market Equilibrium: Evidence on Dividends, Income, and Extraordinary Items,
16 J Accounting Research 26, 30 (1978) (same); Hayne E. Leland and David H. Pyle, Informa-
tional Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation, 32 J Fin 371, 372 (1977)
(stating that the capital structure of a firm signals information); Stephen A. Ross, The Determina-
tion of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach, 8 Bell J Econ 23,25 (1977) (same);
Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q J Econ 355,358-59 (1973) (explaining how potential
employees signal quality by engaging in costly activities such as obtaining a degree); Ross Watts,
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hag as a means of conveying a message about itself," so firms may also
use conspicuous consumption of patents as a means of displaying de-
sirable qualities. At the very least, if a firm were to obtain far more or
fewer patents than similarly situated firms-particularly competitors
in the same industry-its conspicuousness would communicate some
sort of information to the market.
2. Patents can be an effective signal of low future discount rates.
The information contained in a patent is at least minimally credi-
ble, and obtaining patents may be a signal of the firm's willingness to
invest in making credible statements, because patentees can suffer
costs if the information in the patent turns out to be inaccurate." Be-
cause patentees have a duty of candor before the Patent and Trade-
mark Office ("PTO"),6' patents can serve as a signal that a firm has a
low future discount rate. A patentee has an incentive to make sure
that the information contained in the patent document is accurate, be-
cause it can lose a patent for making misstatements to the PTO 6 (and
sometimes suffer worse punishment), even if the misstatements do not
rise to the level of fraud." For example, if a patentee represents that its
invention is able to perform a particular feat when it knows the inven-
tion cannot, the patentee may lose the patent upon a challenge by a
third party. Sufficiently severe misstatements are treated as fraudulent
conduct, the penalties for which exceed mere loss of the patent.63 In
The Information Content of Dividends, 46 J Bus 191, 211 (1973) (noting that dividends provide
information about the future of a firm).
63 See Eric A. Posner, Symbo; Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J Le-
gal Stud 765,772 (1998) (discussing how certain behavior can have a signaling effect). The origi-
nator of conspicuous consumption as a method of signaling desirable qualities-in this case,
wealth-was Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class (Random House 1899).
64 See BaxterInternational, Inc v McGaw, Inc, 149 F3d 1321,1327 (Fed Cir 1998) ("Inequi-
table conduct includes affirmative misrepresentations of a material fact, failure to disclose mate-
rial information, or submission of false material information, coupled with an intent to de-
ceive."); Molins PLC v Textron, Inc, 48 F3d 1172, 1178 (Fed Cir 1995) ("Applicants for patents
are required to prosecute patent applications in the PTO with candor, good faith, and honesty.").
6S Although I refer to "patentees," people with a duty of candor include:
[e]ach inventor named in the application; [e]ach attorney or agent who prepares or prose-
cutes the application; and [e]very other person who is substantively involved in the prepara-
tion or prosecution of the application and who is associated with the inventor, with the as-
signee or with anyone to whom there is an obligation to assign the application.
37 CFR § 1.56(c) (2001).
66 The patentee loses the right to enforce the patent, rather than having the patent itself
declared invalid.
67 Demaco Corp v F Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd, 851 F2d 1387, 1394 (Fed Cir 1988)
("Inequitable conduct may be held although the common law elements of fraud are absent.").
68 For example, in Walker Process Equipment, Inc v Food Machinery & Chemical Corp, 382
US 172 (1965), the patentee failed to disclose its own use of the patent prior to seeking patent
protection. Id at 174. Because the patentee's use put the invention in the public domain pursuant
to 35 USC § 102 (1964), the patentee would not have been granted the patent had the PTO
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exceptional cases, the patentee may be required to pay the fees of
third parties who challenge the validity of the patent.6 Even if the mis-
statements ultimately have nothing to do with the patentability of the
invention, the patentee can still lose the patent for making material
misstatements.n Because firms know that losing a patent for making
misstatements is a public and verifiable event, firms have the incentive
to avoid making statements that are inaccurate and easy to detect.
By getting a patent, a firm devotes resources to warranting that
the information in the patent is accurate. A firm that wants to make
statements that it does not have to pay to warrant might prefer no
protection at all, or trade secrets coupled with confidentiality agree-
ments, over patents.7 ' A firm that wants to convey to observers that it
is making honest statements about its research may choose to seek
patent protection as a means of establishing the credibility of the
statements.
The fact that the information contained in a patent has some
credibility can have value for investors and thereby for firms, too. If a
firm merely issued press releases about its research, investors could
have no way of knowing if the information was credible and would
discount it accordingly. If, on the other hand, a firm got a patent on its
research results, investors would know that the statements made in the
patent were probably credible. The patentee is not warranting that the
information is accurate down to the last jot and tittle; rather, the pat-
entee is warranting that it is not lying or misleading the public and
that if any information in the patent proves inaccurate, the inaccura-
cies are not material. (If the information, unbeknownst to the pat-
entee, turns out to be inaccurate, but the inaccuracy is immaterial, the
patent will not be invalidated. The patentee may be required to cor-
rect the information, however, with the ensuing costs that entails.) For
the cost of obtaining the patent, firms can warrant the credibility of
the statements contained in the patent. A patent is tantamount to an
investment by firms in reputation, the value of which can drop if the
information released turns out to be inaccurate.7 Patenting inventions
known about the use.
69 35 USC § 285 (1994).
70 PerSeptive Biosystems Inc v Pharmacia Biotech, Inc, 225 F3d 1315, 1329 (Fed Cir 2000)
(holding that failure to disclose the full extent of collaboration between named inventors and a
third party can be inequitable conduct); Ulead Systems Inc v Lex Computer & Management
Corp, 130 F Supp 2d 1137,1147 (C D Cal 2001) (finding a false claim of "small entity" status to
be inequitable conduct).
71 This assumes the trade-secret-plus-confidentiality agreement costs less than getting a
patent. For the cost of getting a patent, see text accompanying notes 44-46.
72 Barzel, 25 J L & Econ at 28-32 (cited in note 54) (reviewing the costs of inaccurate in-
formation); Sanford J. Grossman, The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure
about Product Quality, 24 J L & Econ 461, 470-77 (1981) (stating that warranties can act as a
signaling device); Benjamin Klein and Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring
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can represent a credible signal of high firm value, if it is cheaper for
high-value firms (in this case, firms willing to invest in honesty) to do
73
SO.
3. Market actors believe patents are correlated with various
firm attributes.
A theory that patents can serve as signals is supported by evi-
dence showing that patent counts are positively correlated with cer-
tain firm characteristics. Many observers -academics, industry ana-
lysts and investors, venture capitalists, and firms-correlate patents
with desirable firm attributes and have been doing so for decades.
For instance, in the academic literature, simple patent counts have
long been used as a measure of firm productivity, innovative activity,
firm size, and other less readily measurable factors.7 Econometric
models of firm productivity often create a patent production function
in which patenting is a dependent variable and inventive output by the
firm is an independent variable.75 The sheer numerosity of patents has
often been considered to be a more immediate and directly measur-
able consequence of inventive activity than other performance indica-
tors such as profits and product sales.76
Capital markets appear to believe that patent counts correlate
with other, less observable, firm characteristics not directly related to
the inventions. Straight patent counts are used as a means of measur-
Contractual Performance, 89 J Polit Econ 615,617 (1981) (stating that the failure of firms to sup-
ply correct information leads to a drop in market position).
73 See Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole, Game Theory 324-36 (MIT 1991) (modeling basic
signaling games); Ian Ayres, Playing Games with the Law, 42 Stan L Rev 1291, 1301-09 (1990)
(discussing games of asymmetric information).
74 For a summary of some of the work in this area, see Zvi Griliches, Patent Statistics as
Economic Indicators:A Survey, 28 J Econ Lit 1661,1662 (1990) (using patent statistics as a pre-
dictor of a variety of firm parameters, including inventiveness and long-term trends); Griliches,
Pakes, and Hall, The Value of Patents at 97 (cited in note 52) (analyzing the performance of the
most publicly traded U.S. firms from the 1960s through the 1980s). See also Jean Olson Lanjouw,
Patent Protection in the Shadow of Infringement: Simulation Estimates of Patent Value, 65 Rev
Econ Stud 671 (1998).
75 See, for example, Hall and Ziedonis, 32 RAND J Econ at 103 (cited in note 20) (analyz-
ing semiconductor companies); J.G. Montalvo, GMM Estimation of Count-Panel-Data Models
with Fixed Effects and Predetermined Instruments, 15 J Bus & Econ Stat 82,83 (1997); Bronwyn
H. Hall, Zvi Griliches, and Jerry A. Hausman, Patents and R and D: Is There a Lag?, 27 Intl Econ
Rev 265,265 (1986) (using "patent applications in any given year as an indicator of the value of
the additions to the underlying stock of knowledge" of a firm); Jerry A. Hausman, Bronwyn H.
Hall, and Zvi Griliches, Econometric Models for Count Data with an Application to the Patents-
R&D Relationship, 52 Econometrica 909,909-10 (1984); Ariel Pakes and Zvi Griliches, Patents
and R&D at the Firm Level:A First Look, 5 Econ Letters 377,377 (1980) (studying returns on re-
search expenditures).
76 See, for example, Ariel Pakes, On PatentN R&D, and the Stock Market Rate of Return, 93
J Polit Econ 390,390 (1985) ("The patent variable ha[s] the advantage of being a more direct
consequence of inventive activity than the other indicators of performance available.").
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ing otherwise unobservable or difficult-to-measure attributes, such as
knowledge capital or the productivity of R&D spending." Analysts of-
ten treat patents as a benchmark of firm innovativeness. It is not sur-
prising that markets look to a firm's patent portfolio as one factor that
can reveal information about the firm's R&D expenditures. The corre-
lation between patents and R&D expenditures is positive and strong:
changes in a firm's R&D expenditures have a significant effect on
changes in the firm's rate of patenting."8 Patents, therefore, are (at
least) a rough measure of the value of a firm's inputs into R&D. Dy-
namically, capital markets appear to recognize this relationship and
respond to it. Unexpected changes in the number of patents held by a
firm-even an unexpected increase in the size of a portfolio by one
patent-are associated with large changes in the market value of the
firm. 9 When a firm intensifies its patent rate, this often correlates with
an increase in firm value.8
In addition to serving as a means of measuring individual firm
productivity and innovativeness, patents also appear to be a way for
capital markets to benchmark firms relative to each other. Patents ap-
pear to be a fairly good indicator of differences in inventive activity
across firms in an industry.1 Fluctuations in an individual firm's pat-
enting rate over time are indicative of inventive activity (R&D out-
put), but have a large noise component.
Firms also seem to use patents to benchmark their performance
relative to other firms in the industry. Firms patent more intensely
when they perceive competitors in the same industry to be increasing
their levels of patenting. There could be several explanations for this.
Firms could begin to patent more intensely because they want to in-
crease the strength of the legal fences around their own technology. At
the same time, firms could also patent more intensely because they
77 Griliches, 28 J Econ Lit at 1673, 1684 (cited in note 74) (correlating patent counts with
R&D expenditures, stock market value, and other indicators of economic success).
78 Hall, Griliches, and Hausman, 27 Intl Econ Rev at 281 (cited in note 75) (showing a
strong, largely contemporaneous relationship between R&D expenditures and patenting); Pakes,
93 J Polit Econ at 392 (cited in note 76) ("If an event does occur that causes the market to re-
evaluate the accumulated output of the firm's research laboratories, its full effect on stock mar-
ket values ought to be recorded immediately.").
79 Pakes, 93 J Polit Econ at 403,406 (cited in note 76). Pakes finds that an unexpected in-
crease in one patent is associated with an $810,000 increase in the market value of the firms in
his sample. Id. See also Griliches, Pakes, and Hall, The Value of Patents at 109 (cited in note 52).
80 Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam Jaffe, and Manuel Trajtenberg, Market Value and Patent Cita-
tions:A First Look *17, Working Paper No 7741 (NBER 2000) ("An increased yield of one pat-
ent per million dollars of R&D is associated with a two percent increase in the market value of
the firm.").
81 Pakes, 93 J Polit Econ at 405 (cited in note 76) (finding that 76 percent of the variance in
the size of patent portfolios among firms in the same industry can be credited to research-related
events that cause changes in the market value of the firm, although changes in patent rates over
time by a single firm are not as strongly correlated with the firm's rate of inventive output).
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want to match the signal sent by their competitors. Even in industries
where patent appropriability traditionally is poor, firms whose close
competitors engage in more (observable) R&D tend to obtain more
patents per R&D dollar.n Firms that fail to keep up with their com-
petitors in the patent race experience lower market values.8
Patents appear to play a particularly valuable signaling role in the
start-up phase of a firm's life. Among venture capitalists, both the
quantity and quality of patents have long been factors that are taken
into consideration when deciding whether to invest in a company, par-
ticularly in its early stages.n This may explain why start-ups are even
more eager to obtain patents than are established firms.n Indeed, ven-
ture capitalists have treated ownership of intellectual property as a
positive factor in the decision to invest since the modem venture capi-
tal era began in 1946.8 As Mark Lemley puts it, "Venture capitalists
use client patents (or more likely, patent applications) as evidence that
the company is well managed, is at a certain stage in development, and
has defined and carved out a market niche."' ' According to Lemley,
venture capitalists will even evaluate start-ups on the basis of patent
applications if the patents have not yet issued. Bronwyn Hall and
Rosemarie Ziedonis find that for recent market entrants in the semi-
conductor industry, one of the primary roles for patents "appeared to
be in securing capital from private investors in the startup phase.' '
How robust are inter-firm differences in the quantity of patents
as a measure of firm productivity? A straight count of patents as a
measure of innovative output has several rather obvious problems.
First, using straight counts as a measure of productivity overlooks the
82 This study controls for technological opportunities. Adam B. Jaffe, Technological Oppor-
tunity and Spillovers of R&D: Evidence from Firms' Patents, Profits; and Market Value, 76 Am
Econ Rev 984,998 (1986) (concluding that "firms whose research is in areas where there is much
research by other firms have, on average, more patents per dollar of R&D").
83 See id at 998 ("[F]irms with very low R&D suffer lower profits and market value if their
neighbors are R&D intensive.").
84 See David L. Hayes, What the General Intellectual Property Practitioner Should Know
about Patenting Business Methods, 16 Computer Lawyer 3, 4 (Oct 1999) ("Patent protection is
increasingly a factor that investors such as venture capitalists consider in deciding whether to in-
vest in a company, especially in its early stages.").
85 Hall and Ziedonis, 32 RAND J Econ at 104 (cited in note 20). See also Griliches, Pakes,
and Hall, The Value of Patents at 100 (cited in note 52); Mansfield, 32 Mgmt Sci at 177 (cited in
note 52).
86 General Georges Doriot, the founder of the first venture capital firm, American Re-
search & Development, and a man often considered the single most significant figure in post-
World War II venture capital, used intellectual property protection as one of the factors in his in-
vestment decisions. See Joseph W. Bartlett, Fundamentals of Venture Capital 3 (Madison Books
1999).
87 Lemley, 95 Nw U L Rev at 1505-06 (cited in note 2). See also Samuel Kortum and Josh
Lerner, Assessing the Contribution of Venture Capital to Innovation, 31 RAND J Econ 674, 689
(2000) (suggesting "a strong relationship between venture capital [funding] and patenting").
88 Hall and Ziedonis, 32 RAND J Econ at 110 (cited in note 20).
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ability of the firm to vary output along quality margins, and ignores
inefficiencies generated by duplication of effort, waste, opportunity
costs, and transaction costs. Knowledge production is lumpy, so pat-
ents will contain information in varying amounts and qualities. Patents
are by definition heterogeneous. Measurement of the attributes of in-
dividual patents is costly, and the scope and quality of the protection
conferred upon the underlying invention is variable from patent to
patent. Second, even if quality is held constant, the propensity to pat-
ent an invention may vary among firms and among industries. Patents
do not represent all of the output of R&D. Industries vary signifi-
cantly in the average number of patents generated by each dollar in-
vested in R&D.89 The noise in the relationship between patent counts
and the value of the underlying inventions (and by implication, the
firm) makes it difficult to use patent counts as a robust measure of
firm value.9 These observations do not negate the value of patents as a
means of conveying information about the firm; rather, they indicate
that patents are a noisy signal.
Ultimately, patents can be interpreted as signaling many things in
capital markets. Whatever attributes of the firm patents are believed
to correlate with, the signaled characteristics are generally considered
positive.9 More patents equal more money being spent on R&D; more
patents indicate firm confidence in its research. More patents mean
the firm is willing to increase the amount of money it loses if it makes
false statements about its research. Nobody decides that a firm is a
bad investment on the grounds that it has the largest patent portfolio
in the industry. Nobody associates obtaining patents with sloth and
shiftlessness.
My hypothesis that patents serve a signaling function does not
deny the role of the patent system as a means of encouraging innova-
tion by granting exclusive rights to inventors. Rather, the signaling
function of patents is part of the larger view about the nature of prop-
erty rights to information and the efficiency concerns surrounding
those rights. It is based on the assumption that many attributes of the
89 See John Bound, et al, Who Does R&D and Who Patents?, in Zvi Griliches, ed, R&D,
Patents and Productivity 21, 26 (Chicago 1984) (showing variations); FM. Scherer, The Propen-
sity to Patent, 1 Intl J Indus Org 107,110 (1983) (same).
90 See Griliches, Pakes, and Hall, The Value of Patents at 109 (cited in note 52) (noting that
patents contain a significant noise component). See also Jean 0. Lanjouw, Ariel Pakes, and Jona-
than Putnam, How to Count Patents and Value Intellectual Property: The Uses of Patent Renewal
and Application Data, 46 J Indus Econ 405, 406 (1998), for a recitation of some of the difficulties.
91 Observers' perception of patents can sometimes be negative. On occasion, firms may
choose to forgo obtaining or enforcing patent rights in order to signal that they are "good types."
See, for example, Melody Petersen and Donald G. MacNeil, Jr., Maker Yielding Patent in Africa
for AIDS Drug, NY Times Al (Mar 15,2001) (describing how Bristol-Myers Squibb was praised
when it announced its decision not to enforce its patent on the AIDS treatment d4T in Africa).
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firm are hard to measure. Investors have good statistical information
across the market (or industry) but not with respect to the research
projects of individual firms.
B. A Patent Signaling Model
If patents serve as an accurate signal, then observers will be able
to distinguish high-quality firms from low-quality firms on the basis of
the firm's patent portfolio. Given that capital markets use a firm's
patent portfolio as one means of measuring other more opaque firm
attributes, however, firms have the incentive to manipulate this public,
measurable, and voluntary attribute. If patents are a signal that is too
easy for low-quality firms to send, then observers may believe patent
portfolios correlate with firm quality when they really do not.
Below, I present a model of patent signaling. I also explore
whether there are multiple equilibria in this model, and how many
there might be. The basic insights in this model recur in the applica-
tion of signaling to such issues as capital structure, dividend policy, ad-
vertising, education, insurance, and social norms.9
Consider a world in which investors divide firms conducting re-
search into two types:3 innovative and boring. Innovative firms (1)
have a portfolio of research projects that managers believe will have a
high expected payoff on average; boring firms (B) have a portfolio of
research projects that they believe will have low expected payoffs. As-
sume the payoff will not be attributable to the possession of patent
rights. For example, assume that both types of firms expect that pat-
ents will confer no appropriability because nobody in the industry
bothers to enforce them. By the time a competitor copies the patented
product and builds production facilities, the technology covered by the
patent has become obsolete. Knowing this ex ante, competitors will
not copy. Note that this does not mean that appropriability per se is
zero, just that it is not the presence of legal rules that deters copying.
Innovative firms believe that the products generated by the research
are of high quality and that first-mover advantages (not patents) will
allow them to reap profits.
Assume that firms know their type and that investors are risk
neutral. If there is symmetric information as to firm type, investors will
know whether they are investing in innovative or boring firms. Under
92 1 have adapted this model from the one presented by Ross, 8 Bell J Econ at 25-32 (cited
in note 62). Ross's model is used to demonstrate the use of the debt-equity mix by a firm to sig-
nal quality. More formal descriptions of signaling models can be found in many game theory
texts. See, for example, Fudenberg and Trole, Game Theory at 324-29, 446-60 (cited in note 73)
(providing analyses of signaling games).
93 Quality, of course, is a continuum. While realizing that types are distributed continuously,
I divide firms into two types for the convenience of my model.
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these conditions, they will be willing to invest more in companies that
have a portfolio of innovative research projects than those that do not.
Let the expected value at some future time (t = 1) of innovative firms
be i and that of boring firms be b. Because innovative firms are more
highly valued, i > b. Assume that the value of innovative and boring
firms at t = 0 is determined by capital markets according to an ac-
cepted method of valuation, based on the expected future value of the
firm. In the interest of simplicity I assume that the risk-free discount
rate is zero. I further assume that the variance in the payoff from in-
novative and boring firms is the same. The value of innovative and
boring firms at t = 0 is as follows:
(7) V 01= i and VB = b.
Now suppose there is asymmetric information between firms and
investors as to firm type. Investors will not be able to separate the in-
novative firms from the boring ones and will believe that they are in-
vesting in both types. Unable to separate innovative from boring firms,
investors will treat all firms as if they were average. Innovative firms
would then bear the costs of the information asymmetry. I assume that
even if investors do not know the type of a specific firm, they can form
a probability distribution of innovative and boring firms. If investors
know the proportion of innovative firms to be x and boring firms to be
(1 - x), all firms will have the same market value at t = 0. This can be
represented by the equation:
(8) V0 = xi + (1 - x)b, where V0,'> V0 > V08 .
Consequently, innovative firms will have an incentive to disclose
the superior nature of their research results so that they can appear
more attractive to investors. Innovative firms might simply claim to
have superior research projects in order to increase their value at t = 0,
but boring firms could well claim the same thing. If boring firms could
send the same signals as innovative firms, the signals would not be
credible because they would not allow investors to sort firms with dif-
ferent unobservable characteristics. Both types of firms, making iden-
tical claims, would continue to be indistinguishable and their values
would not change from V0.9'
94 This is an example of a lemons problem, as described by George A. Akerlof, The Market
for "Lemons". Quality, Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q J Econ 488,488 (1970) (dis-
cussing adverse selection and the use of signals to overcome it). See also Grossman, 24 J L &
Econ at 462 (cited in note 72) (discussing situations in which good sellers can distinguish them-
selves from bad ones); Charles Wilson, The Nature of Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse Selec-
tion, 11 Bell J Econ 108, 130 (1980) (reviewing variable equilibrium points when restricted to
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In order to make credible claims, innovative firms must engage in
behaviors that impose substantial monetary or reputational costs if
the signal is inaccurate.9 5 These costs must be so high that boring firms
would find them too costly to send. As I demonstrated in Part II, ob-
taining patents is not a costless endeavor, so obtaining a patent portfo-
lio could serve as a credible signal of firm quality. Obtaining patents
may be an effective signal that is hard for boring firms to mimic be-
cause the cost of obtaining patents deters boring firms from attempt-
ing to signal in this manner. When the cost of the signal separates out
firms by type, the signal is self-enforcing.
Assume the process of obtaining a patent portfolio of specific
characteristics P costs boring firms more than it costs innovative firms.
We can say that boring firms bear a cost C and innovative firms bear a
cost aC, where o. is some value less than unity (that is, 0 < a < 1).
Note that the cost differential a is a crucial component of the effec-
tiveness of patents as a signal of firm type. As I explore later in this
Part, if obtaining a portfolio of patents costs boring firms as much as it
costs innovative firms, such that a = 1, then patents become ambigu-
ous as a signal.
If investors interpret the costly behavior of obtaining a patent
portfolio as a signal of firm type, then they will conclude that firms
that obtain P are innovative firms and those that do not are boring
firms. The value of an innovative firm at t = 0 is:
(9) V0 = i- aC if it obtains P, or b if it does not,
whereas the value of a boring firm at t = 0 is:
(10) V0 = i - C if it obtains P, or b if it does not.
Innovative firms desiring to maximize firm value have the incen-
tive to seek patents, and therefore to signal accurately, if their cost
(aC) of doing so is less than the change in value an innovative firm
would experience by being labeled a boring firm, which simplifies to
C < (i - b)/o'. Boring firms have the incentive not to seek patents, and
thereby signal accurately, if the cost of doing so is greater than the
price information). For discussion of the implications of the lemons problem, see Bruce
Greenwald, Joseph E. Stiglitz, and Andrew Weiss, Information Imperfections in the Capital Mar-
ket and Macroeconomics Fluctuations, 74 Am Econ Rev Papers & Proceedings 194 (1984) (argu-
ing that signaling effects may restrict a firm's access to equity markets); Stewart C. Myers and
Nicholas S. Majluf Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information
That Investors Do Not Have, 13 J Fm Econ 187 (1984).
95 For a description of self-confirming signals, see Spence, 87 Q J Econ at 360 (cited in note
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change in value a boring firm would experience by being labeled an
innovative firm, that is, if C > i - b. Patents would serve as an effective
signal in equilibrium if the marginal benefit to a firm of being per-
ceived by investors as innovative rather than boring is less than the
cost to a boring firm of signaling but more than the cost to an innova-
tive firm of signaling. In other words, a separating equilibrium may ex-
ist where the signal P costs more than i - b and less than (i - b)/&a9 In
equilibrium, the signal separates the innovative and boring firms be-
cause only the innovative firms engage in the behavior the signal
represents.
Note that a signal can still produce a separation between innova-
tive and boring firms when it is not costly to send the signal but costly
to send it falsely. Such signals are effective when sanctions created by
legal rules, such as loss of reputation or liability, impose costs on dis-
honest signalers that are higher than the costs imposed on honest sig-
nalers.2 On this view, it does not matter what attribute is being sig-
naled or how, so long as the fear of reputational loss serves to distin-
guish firms possessing the signaled attribute from those that do not.
Informal ex post reputational sanctions may not be enough to pro-
duce a signaling equilibrium, in which case firms possessing the sig-
naled attribute may seek other devices to force separation between
firms possessing and not possessing the attribute. One method would
be to create a legal regime that penalizes false signalers, with formal
legal sanctions replacing or supplementing informal reputational sanc-
tions. With respect to patents, some degree of formal legal sanctions
exists. If a patentee is found to have misrepresented information in
the patent (inequitable conduct), the patent will be invalidated ex
post." At the very least, investors can be assured that firms will not
make objectively false statements in the body of the patent; if they do,
they will bear both actual and reputational costs. By affecting the ac-
tivities of firms, legal rules can affect the way information is trans-
ferred between parties.
96 For purposes of this Article, I assume partial equilibrium analysis: that the values of
other attributes of the firm (especially goods and services) unrelated to the firm's patenting
practices remain constant. To the extent they are not, that only reinforces my point that the value
of a patent may depend on more than its ability to appropriate rents. On partial versus general
equilibrium analysis, see generally, James M. Henderson and Richard E. Quandt, Microeconomic
Theory:A MathematicalApproach (McGraw-Hill 3d ed 1980).
97 Firms could also precommit to signal honestly by posting a bond that would be lost
should the signal turn out to be false. As I discuss in this Article, the patent system can be com-
pared to a bonding device.
98 See notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
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C. The Potential Ambiguity of Patent Signals
Do patents really separate firms by type? In the absence of em-
pirical data, it is not possible to say whether the patent system creates
a pooling equilibrium or a separating equilibrium in fact. I have used
insights from the corporate law literature to theorize that the patent
system might be able to serve as a separating mechanism under cer-
tain conditions. On the other hand, patents and portfolios may be am-
biguous signals that create a pooling equilibrium. Let us consider
some of the factors that can serve to muddy signals sent by the patent
system.
1. Patents may fail to separate firms by type.
Patents would operate as a signal that serves to separate firms by
type when there is an equilibrium in which innovative firms have the
incentive to patent (or patent more) and boring firms do not, and as a
result the signals are believed by investors. By contrast, a pooling
equilibrium obtains when innovative and boring firms alike have the
incentive to signal by obtaining patents. Investors are unable to distin-
guish firms by type based on their patenting activities." In my model,
two pooling equilibria could occur: no firms signal, or all firms signal
inefficiently. The equilibrium in which no firms signal can be further
subdivided. First, signaling could prove too costly even for innovative
firms (that is, C > (i - b)/), in which case innovative and boring firms
alike do not signal. Alternatively, signaling could be too cheap: firms
have the incentive not to signal if the cost is less than the difference in
value between innovative and boring firms (that is, C < i - b), if inves-
tors know that signaling is cheap and consequently will not believe
any signal, and if firms know investors' beliefs ex ante.
In the second pooling equilibrium, in which all firms signal and
do so inefficiently, innovative firms lack sufficient information to fore-
see that they cannot reach a separating equilibrium, but firms' knowl-
edge of investor sorting practices in turn leads to feedback effects. In-
novative firms signal by obtaining patents, and boring firms emulate
the signaling behavior of the innovative firms. Once both types of
firms are signaling, both types fear abandoning the behavior because
investors might interpret it as a sign of low firm quality. If investors
come to realize that the signal is false, they will no longer be willing to
invest in both types of firms even at V, because the cost of sending
the signal decreases the average firm value to V - C.
99 See Spence, 87 Q J Econ at 356 (cited in note 62) (stating that a lack of information
about prospective job applicants makes both good and bad applicants appear similar to a poten-
tial employer).
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An innovative firm might prefer not to signal and rely on trade
secrets instead of patents to protect the invention, if investors applied
an average value (V0,) to firms that did not signal with patents. Faced
with some firms obtaining patents and others not, investors will inter-
pret the absence of a signal as evidence that the firm lacks confidence
in the future profitability of its research projects. Given the choice be-
tween not obtaining patents and being labeled boring and obtaining
patents and being labeled innovative, a firm with innovative projects
will prefer to be accurately labeled.
The process of signaling then becomes a race between innovative
firms trying to outsignal boring ones and boring firms trying to keep
pace with the innovative firms' signals. Obviously, the race cannot go
on forever. At some point, the marginal benefits to innovative firms of
getting the nth patent will be exceeded by the marginal costs to inves-
tors of processing the additional information. When this point of in-
vestor information overload is reached, firms will seek lower-cost,
more effective strategies to reduce informational asymmetries.
This signaling approach is individually rational but socially ineffi-
cient. If boring firms can falsely match the signal sent by innovative
firms by obtaining patents, this imposes an externality on innovative
firms. The inefficiency arises not just because boring firms spend re-
sources falsely matching innovative firms' signals but also because in-
novative firms may signal excessively in an attempt to distinguish
themselves from boring firms.
2. Signalers and observers could be misinformed.
Another source of ambiguity in the signal could arise if signalers
and observers are not accurately informed about the circumstances
surrounding the signal. For example, observers may believe that pat-
ents correlate with some firm characteristic when in fact they do not.
Correlations between patents and other firm attributes, to the extent
they exist, will vary depending on the characteristic in question. Or in-
formation flows may not be accurate because observers may believe
the signal to have less noise than it actually does. I have already dis-
cussed how straight patent counts may be poor signals (despite the
fact that they are widely used) because they are noisy. Observers,
however, may believe the signal to be crisper than it really is if they
overestimate the correlation between the patent signal and underlying
firm quality. These inquiries raise the question of the degree to which
patents convey information about the fundamentals of the firm. '+
100 The market is informationally efficient when stock prices immediately reflect different
categories of available information; it is fundamentally efficient when stock prices reflect the
present value of firms' expected profits, given the information available. See Ian Ayres, Back to
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Whether patents actually correlate with fundamentals is a question far
beyond the scope of this Article, and one I will leave to others to ex-
plore.
In my model, I assumed that there are two types, and that firms
know their type. As I pointed out, however, in reality type is a contin-
uum. Firms will not be divided neatly into high-quality and low-quality
firms, nor will firm quality remain constant over time. Such factors in-
crease the probability that any patent signal sent by a firm will not
correlate neatly with a discrete type and thus that observers will not
be accurately informed.
Even if only two types of firms existed, using patents as a mecha-
nism to separate firms by type requires that a patentee know its type
and signal honestly. Patentees may be mistaken as to type. Here,
rather than attempting to signal falsely, patentees are wrong in their
estimation of value.
Mistakes could arise simply because of uncertainty, biased judg-
ment, or both. Behavioral decision theory presents us with ever-
increasing evidence of cognitive biases of sundry sorts, often involving
people overestimating their abilities or chances of success. ' For ex-
ample, more than 88 percent of high school seniors polled believed
they were above average in their ability to get along well with others.in
A survey of Silicon Valley engineers found that more than one-third
of the engineers polled described their performance as placing them
in the top 5 percent of the profession and nearly 90 percent thought
they were in the top 25 percent, whereas less than 1 percent believed
their performance to be below average.m Nor is the bias confined to
engineers. Almost 90 percent of drivers surveyed believed their driv-
ing skills were above those of the average driver."" And academics arenot immune from over-positive assessment either: 94 percent of col-
Basics: Regulating How Corporations Speak to the Market, 77 Va L Rev 945, 965-75 (1991) (de-
fining informational and fundamental efficiency).
101 See, for example, Lee Ross and Craig A. Anderson, Shortcoming in the Attribution Proc-
ess: On the Origins and Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assets, in Daniel Kahneman, Paul
Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 127, 129-31
(Cambridge 1982) (discussing attribution theory). Such theory is not without its critics. See, for
example, Gerd Gigerenzer, How To Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond "Heuristics and
Biases", 2 Eur Rev Soc Psych 83, 86-101 (1991) (arguing that phenomena attributed to cognitive
biases do not actually violate probability theory).
102 College Entrance Examination Board, National Report on College-Bound Seniors, 1975-
76 9, 20 (1976).
103 Joseph Bankman and Ronald J. Gilson, Why Start-Ups?, 51 Stan L Rev 289, 291 n 3
(1999).
104 Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful than Our Fellow Drivers?, 47 Acta
Psychologica 143,146 (1981).
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lege professors surveyed asserted that they were better teachers than
their average colleague."n
If individuals in myriad situations overestimate the quality of
their skills and attributes, then firm managers might as well. If a man-
ager believes his or her firm is conducting research that is of higher
quality than it actually is, managers may misestimate firm type and
seek to patent too much.'O Under this circumstance, patents will fail to
distinguish firms that are accurately assessing their research as innova-
tive from those that are viewing their research too optimistically.
When managers overassess the future value of the research and seek
to signal their confidence in the research to capital markets, the signal
sent by a large patent portfolio can be ambiguous because both good
and bad types are signaling. So long as the problem is firms not know-
ing their type because of cognitive biases, rather than adverse selec-
tion, increasing the costs of patenting will not improve the separation.
If firm managers could accurately evaluate the probability distribution
of returns for each research project, then the chances of the patenting
signal being ambiguous would diminish.
Even if firms know their types and signal accurately and the ob-
servers appropriately discount for the noise, the informational content
of patents as a signal might still be weakened. If observers believed
that a firm was not likely to be a repeat player-that it was a fly-by-
night operation, that it would not be in the market long-my argu-
ment that firms use their intellectual property as a means of credibly
signaling otherwise difficult-to-measure qualities would carry less
weight. For example, a start-up firm that was unsure of its future suc-
cess might choose to obtain an "excessive" number of patents in order
to impress investors. As Michael Spence points out, complications
arise when players-in this case patentees and observers, but it could
be any two parties to a signaling game -are aware that another player
thinks of an activity as a signal!"' Alternatively, firms that are not con-
fident in their research projects may obtain patents in order to conceal
the riskiness of their activities. Signalers, therefore, must be in the
market long enough that observers believe them to have the incentive
to invest in credible signaling.
105 K. Patricia Cross, Not Can, But Will College Teaching Be Improved?, 17 New Directions
for Higher Educ 1, 10 (1977).
106 For a general discussion of risk assessment and managerial bias, see Daniel Kahneman
and Dan Lovallo, Timid Choices and Bold Forecasts: A Cognitive Perspective on Risk Taking, in
Richard P Rumelt, Dan E. Schendel, and David J. Teece, eds, Fundamental Issues in Strategy 71,
71 (Harvard Business School 1994) (arguing that "decision makers are excessively prone to treat
problems as unique, neglecting both the statistics of the past and the multiple opportunities of
the future").
107 Spence, 87 Q J Econ at 358-59 (cited in note 62).
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3. Signals versus satisfaction of some other preferences.
Because the behavior of a firm is the outcome of multiple vari-
ables, the motives behind the behavior may be ambiguous, rendering
the signaling value of the behavior noisy. One could argue that a
source of ambiguity is whether a firm signals in order to convey in-
formation about attributes that are not readily measurable, or whether
it does so for some other reason. Even if patentees are obtaining pat-
ents for reasons other than appropriability, they might not be doing so
for reasons that have anything to do with signaling. On this argument,
a firm's decision to obtain a large number of patents may be highly
correlated with high firm quality, but this does not necessarily mean
obtaining patents is a signaling strategy if the firm would have had the
same incentives to obtain a large patent portfolio even if there were
no informational asymmetries between the firm and investors. If firms
are obtaining patents when many of those firms believe patents to be
a poor means of appropriability, maybe they do not intend to send
signals but instead are doing so for other reasons that have nothing to
do with appropriability (such as gaining tax benefits).'
On this view, sending a signal requires some deliberate intention
on the part of the sender, whereas information that comprises an in-
dex is not generated with signaling intent. For example, the decision to
obtain patents would be an index if firm managers were unaware that
investors interpreted such a decision as a sign of quality. On this ar-
gument, the decision would not be an attempt to signal, regardless of
what investors perceive, because firms would not be engaging in the
underlying behavior (patenting) in order to convey information about
the firm. In order for obtaining patents to serve as a signal, managers
would have to get patents for the purpose of conveying information
about the firm to the market. Managers might be motivated to get
patents for any number of reasons that might or might not have to do
with appropriability, but those reasons would not include signaling ef-
ficiencies. Perhaps obtaining a patent is just an observable characteris-
103 Taxpayers may deduct the costs of qualifying research activities. 26 USC § 174(a)(1)
(1994) ("A taxpayer may treat research or experimental expenditures which are paid or incurred
by him during the taxable year in connection with his trade or business as expenses which are
not chargeable to capital account. The expenditures so treated shall be allowed as a deduction.").
Qualifying expenses include the costs of obtaining a patent and the costs of developing or im-
proving a pilot model, process, formula, invention, technique, or similar property. Treas Reg
§ 1.174-2(a)(1)-(2) (1999) (containing examples). Obtaining a patent may improve the chance of
other expenditures on the same research project being deemed deductible. See, for example,
Magee v Commissioner, 32 Tax Ct Mem Dee (CCH) 1277,1278-80 (1973) (holding that procur-
ing a patent was strong evidence of an expectation of economic return and thereby allowing de-
ductions pursuant to IRC § 174 (1954) for such indirect expenditures as telephone expenses,
travel costs, and labor costs incurred in invention activities).
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tic of a firm that does not represent any attempt to convey informa-
tion in capital markets.
Alternatively, one could argue that a behavior does not have to
be deliberately sent in order to be a signal. For a particular behavior
to be a signal, it is only necessary for observers to believe that it serves
as a signal. On this argument, investors need only perceive a correla-
tion between firm type and a behavior. Thus, if investors recognize
that firms with large patent portfolios experience profits from their
research projects, the behavior of amassing a large patent portfolio
becomes a signal, whether the firms know it or not.
In addition to granting exclusionary rights, patents may also serve
as a means of allowing property holders to convey information to the
world. A primary function of the patent system is defining rights to
ideas. But in the course of defining rights to ideas, it may generate sig-
nals of other attributes. If it is in fact the case that patents are corre-
lated with positive firm characteristics (or positive employee charac-
teristics in the labor market context), then the patent system produces
signals about attributes that are harder to measure.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
Signaling and information costs have broad implications, both
theoretical and practical, for our understanding of the private value of
patents. In this Part, I consider some of these implications. First, I con-
sider some efficiency aspects of patents as a signal. I discuss various
collective and institutional mechanisms that attempt to increase the
credibility of the information contained in a patent. Then I consider
how firms may focus on different aspects of the patent signal. Finally, I
focus on how the information value of patents can influence our un-
derstanding of the welfare effects of the patent system.
A. Some Efficiency Aspects of Patents as Signals
Recall that determining the attributes of firms has positive
measurement costs. Many attributes are not readily measurable at
all and even if measurable are not verifiable. Observers could at-
tempt to determine the attributes of a firm and its research projects,
but if measurement and verification are conducted without the
firm's assistance, this would be duplicative and costly. Because di-
rect observation and measurement of a firm's attributes are costly,
observers can benefit if they use signals emitted by the firm. As I
have argued, patents can serve as such a signal. If patents increase
the amount of accurate information available to observers, they can
reduce investors' risk. We can expect observers to be sensitive to the
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second order costs incurred in interpreting the patent signal in addi-
tion to the first order costs of measuring a firm's attributes.
1. Verification and evaluation costs.
Investors have the incentive to verify and evaluate the informa-
tion contained in the signal because firms have the incentive to signal
opportunistically.'o In addition to knowing that a firm has a portfolio
of a certain size or that it holds a particular patent, investors may want
to determine what information the patent contains and whether the
information is accurate. Firms obviously have the incentive to present.
positive information about their attributes. 0 Recipients then must de-
termine if the firm behaved opportunistically in disclosing the infor-
mation. Firm managers may stand to benefit, at least in the short term,
by having investors overvalue the firm. For example, managers may
have the incentive to make misstatements in the patent in order to in-
crease firm value. If the quality of the signal released by the firm is dif-
ficult to determine, investors will discount the information's accuracy.
Firms then will have too little incentive to provide verifiable signals,
because they will be discounted to an average level of believability."'
Although they may reduce information costs, patents and portfo-
lios present their own set of information costs. Not all the attributes of
the patent signal are readily measurable. Some aspects of the signal
present higher verification costs than others. A firm's claim that it has
a portfolio of five hundred patents can be easily verified; a firm's
claim that it has five hundred valid patents presents higher verifica-
tion costs; and a firm's claim that its five hundred patents are of high
quality is difficult if not impossible to verify. A firm's claim that it has
patented a new scientific discovery is easy to verify along one margin
(the discovery is patented), but presents higher verification costs
along others (whether it is truly new or innovative).
Verifying the quantity of patents held by a firm presents low
costs. Patents are made public the day they are issued. The text of a
patent is readily available at the PTO's website. If a firm asserts that it
possesses a particular patent in its portfolio, or claims to have a certain
number of unexpired patents in its portfolio, such statements can be
109 See, for example, Hirshleifer, 61 Am Econ Rev at 569-70 (cited in note 24) (discussing
the difficulty of valuing information). The general problem of verification costs is presented in
Barzel, 25 J L & Econ at 28-32 (cited in note 54).
110 Firms could choose to disclose negative information if such disclosure would mitigate
the degree to which recipients would assume it was negative. S.J. Grossman and O.D. Hart, Dis-
closure Laws and Takeover Bids, 35 J Fm 323,326-27 (1980). The marginal benefit of revealing
the negative information would of course have to outweigh the costs of doing so. Along the same
lines, the firm might choose to reveal negative information if doing so would make positive in-
formation appear more credible.
III The lemons problem appears again. See note 94 and accompanying text.
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readily verified. Verifying anything beyond quantity presents higher
costs. Observers may employ experts such as attorneys, consultants, or
scientists to examine individual patents more closely. Observers must
still verify the information individually, but at least such verification
achieves some economies of scale and experience in analyzing the in-
formation contained in the patent.
If patenting is used as a signal of positive firm attributes, investors
must correlate patents and portfolios with desirable firm qualities. Ob-
taining the necessary training to evaluate the signal has positive costs.
Some aspects of the signal, such as the number of patents in a firm's
portfolio, present lower evaluation costs than others, such as interpret-
ing the information contained in each patent. If observers' informa-
tion costs are high enough, a firm might not realize any positive return
on its investment in signaling through patents.
Investors can respond to verification costs in various ways. One
response is for observers of the signal to verify the signal themselves.
Alternatively, investors can use third-party experts. 1 2 If the aspect of a
patent signal to be verified is whether the firm actually has the patent,
this presents low verification costs. But if the aspect of the signal to be
verified is anything other than who owns it, the verification costs rise
considerably. If each investor had to shoulder all the verification costs
of the information contained in a patent, this would duplicate effort
and waste resources. Collective mechanisms can reduce investors'
verification costs.
Why use collective mechanisms to reduce verification costs? Why
not just rely on firms' reputations? After all, if patents are a means of
conveying information, and if investors are concerned with the accu-
racy of the information, why not just rely on firms' reputations for
honesty? Reliance on reputation, without more, proves problematic
for several reasons. Firms may not have established reputations, per-
haps because they have not had the time or capital to do so. Start-ups
and first-time patentees would have a difficult time convincing ob-
servers of the veracity of the statements contained in the patent. Pat-
entees would not be able to reap the benefits of a reputation for hon-
esty without establishing a reputation for honesty. But they could not
establish a reputation for honesty unless others were to measure the
honesty of their statements. Firms with short-term horizons (such as
those that intend to get only one patent before being bought out) may
have insufficient incentives to invest in a reputation for honesty, or to
signal honestly with the patent.
112 See Charles A. Holloway, Decision Making under Uncertainty: Models and Choices 346-
51 (Prentice-Hall 1979); Leland and Pyle, 32 J Fin at 382-84 (cited in note 62) (discussing the
need for financial intermediaries).
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2. The credibility of the information conveyed.
Several mechanisms exist to increase the credibility and clarity of
the information conveyed by patents and portfolios and thereby re-
duce the costs of verifying and evaluating the signal. First, consider the
role of the PTO as an agent for reducing the evaluation costs of in-
formation."' The PTO can serve as an intermediary because it is a re-
peat player that may suffer a reputational loss when it allows a patent
to issue that contains obvious errors.14 The PTO offers its own evalua-
tion of certain aspects of the information contained in the patent. At
least in theory, issuance of a patent stands for the proposition that the
PTO has reviewed the information contained in a patent and declared
that it describes something new, useful, and nonobvious.Y Put more
precisely, issuance of a patent represents that the PTO was unable to
disprove the patentee's claim that the information describes an inven-
tion that is new, useful, and nonobvious."6 By centralizing the function
of taking a first shot at evaluating the information contained in a pat-
ent and publishing the patent once it is issued, the PTO presents
economies of scale and experience in evaluating the attributes of a
patent. ' Because the PTO, unlike the patentee, is a super-long-term
player in the patent process, there are no final-period problems.
The PTO is an imperfect mechanism, however, for assuring that
the information contained in a patent is credible. The PTO's evalua-
113 Examples of information intermediaries in other contexts include accounting firms, law
firms, rating agencies, investment banking firms, and venture capital funds. For a discussion of the
role of venture capital funds as informational intermediaries, see Bankman and Gilson, 51 Stan L
Rev at 300-01 (cited in note 103) (arguing that venture capitalists may have greater expertise in
marketing and developing new products); Alon Brav and Paul Gompers, Myth or Reality?: The
Long-Run Underperformance of Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Venture and Nonventure
Capital-Backed Companies, 52 J Fin 1791, 1792-93 (1997) (examining the relationship between
venture capital backing and IPO performance); Paul Gompers and Josh Lerner, Conflict of In-
terest in the Issuance of Public Securities: Evidence from Venture Capital, 42 J L & Econ 1, 24-26
(1999) (concluding that evidence from venture affiliates of investment bankers suggests that the
market discounts for potential conflicts of interest). But see Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert
of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 Wash U L Q 619,
711 (1999), for a skeptical view of rating agencies as intermediaries.
114 See, for example, David L. Strom, Hyper-Light-Speed Antenna, U.S. Patent No 6,025,810
(Feb 15,2000) ("The present invention takes a transmission of energy, and instead of sending it
through normal time and space, it pokes a small hole into another dimension, thus, sending the
energy through a place which allows transmission of energy to exceed the speed of light.").
115 The requirements of utility, novelty, and nonobviousness can be found in 35 USC §§ 101
(1994), 102 (1994 & Supp 2000), and 103 (1994 & Supp 2000), respectively.
116 Once a patent applicant submits an application to the PTO, the burden of persuasion
and the initial burden of production are shifted to the PTO. In re Oetiker, 977 F2d 1443, 1449
(Fed Cir 1992) (Plager concurring).
117 Economies of scale generally arise when average costs decline as output increases. See
Dennis W. Carlton and Jeffrey M. Perloff Modern Industrial Organization 35 (3d ed 2000).
Economies of experience arise because all else equal, entities get better at things as they do them
more.
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tion of a patent may be so poor or hurried as to be near meaningless.
Most of the assertions made by a patent applicant are taken on faith;
only rarely does the PTO seek verification of a patent applicant's as-
sertions."8 Complaints about the PTO's ability to screen patent appli-
cations adequately have been increasing."9 Under tight budgets and
notoriously tight time schedules, the PTO lets patents slip through
that contain incredible information.'22
In addition to PTO review, another way to increase the credibility
of the information contained in a patent is to impose penalties on pat-
entees who provide false information. The inequitable conduct provi-
sions of patent practice are one mechanism that links penalties with
inaccurate patentee statements.1 2' Recall that patentees can lose an is-
sued patent, and potentially suffer worse penalties, for making inaccu-
rate statements in the document.' By imposing higher costs on pat-
entees who would attempt to take advantage of high observer verifi-
cation costs by making false statements in the patent, penalties for in-
equitable conduct make it more costly for dishonest firms to mimic
the behavior of honest firms. By limiting the actions patent applicants
can take in the course of obtaining a patent or attaching consequences
such as loss of the patent (and more) to some actions, such as misrep-
resentation before the PTO, legal rules affect not only what actions
patentees take, but what inferences observers can draw from those ac-
tions.2
The penalties of inequitable conduct do not insure that the in-
formation contained in a patent is completely credible. To be sure, ap-
plicants are under a general "duty of candor and good faith" in all
their representations before the PTO.'2 Patentees warrant that the in-
formation contained in an issued patent is not known to them to be
false, and if it is inadvertently false, it is not materially so."5 But the in-
118 See, for example, Revised Utility Examination Guidelines, 64 Fed Reg 71440, 71441-42
(1999) (discussing assertions of utility).
119 See, for example, Lemley, 95 Nw U L Rev at 1495-96 (cited in note 2) (citing sources).
120 See John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal
for Patent Bounties, 2001 U Ill L Rev 305 (discussing examiner dockets and the PTO's budget).
See also <http://www.bustpatents.com> (visited Mar 26, 2002) for a list of subsequently invali-
dated patents.
121 See text accompanying notes 64-70 for a discussion of the inequitable conduct provi-
sions.
122 See id.
123 By requesting a reexamination of its own patent, a patentee can signal its confidence
about the soundness of the patent to observers. A patentee is unlikely to challenge its own patent
unless it believes the patent will be upheld on reexamination.
124 37 CFR § 1.56, commonly referred to as "Rule 56," calls for applicants to disclose only
information material to the patentability of a claim of which they are aware.
125 It is not surprising that patentees warrant aspects of the patent that are under their own
control (for example, does the invention do what the patentee claims it does?) and are least
likely to be affected by the actions of others (will market conditions allow the product to sell
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equitable conduct provisions apply only to certain types of informa-
tion. Applicants are under an obligation to disclose "all information
known to that individual to be material to patentability." 6 This creates
the incentive for patentees to remain willfully ignorant of information
that might weaken the patent application, thus lowering the informa-
tion value of the patent."
The threat of punishment for inequitable conduct is further
weakened by the cost of detecting the misstatements. Patentees know
that before they can be prosecuted for inequitable conduct, a third
party must incur the costs of detecting the misstatements. Knowing
this, firms may have the incentive to make statements that are mis-
leading but are unlikely to be detected. The accuracy of the informa-
tion contained in the patent may not be readily determinable, and ob-
servers might have to spend substantial resources to determine
whether the patentee's implicit warranty of accuracy has been vio-
lated. Subsequent events will not necessarily reveal the accuracy of
the statements made in the patent. Even if the information contained
in a patent is facially inaccurate, competitors may not find it worth
their while to bring a challenge.
Despite the weaknesses of the inequitable conduct provisions,
few patentees have ever been found to make misstatements severe
enough to warrant punishment. It's not for lack of trying on the part
of third parties.m Nor is it because the charge isn't taken seriously.'"
well?).
126 37 CFR § 1.56(a).
127 Commentators appear to disagree on the extent to which this incentive induces willful
ignorance in practice. According to Glenn S. Tenney, past chair of the Intellectual Property
Committee of the Institute for Electrical and Electronic Engineers, patent attorneys advise their
clients only to reveal information they already know, and not to search for additional informa-
tion, lest it reveal material that adversely affects the patentability of the invention. Panel Ex-
plores Validity of PTO Practices in Examining Business Method Patents, 60 BNA Patent, Trade-
mark & Copyright J 278,280 (2000). Ron Laurie, an attorney with Skadden,Arps, Slate, Meagher
& Flom in Palo Alto, disputes Tenney's argument. Id at 280-81. Laurie contends that companies
looking to go public actively want to avoid having bad patents in their portfolios. Id. According
to Laurie, IPO underwriters closely scrutinize the strength of patent applications. Id. If additional
searching would reveal weaknesses in the patent application, the underwriters' counsel wants to
know. Upon closer inspection, these two streams of thought are compatible. Patentees may de-
sire to remain ignorant of information that adversely affects the patentability of the invention, so
as to avoid the worst (or perhaps all) of the inequitable conduct penalties, whereas underwriters,
who act as reputational intermediaries, may want to find out information that affects the pat-
entability of the invention.
128 There has been no shortage of patentees charged with making misstatements. See
Molins PLC v Textron, Inc, 48 F3d 1172,1182 (Fed Cir 1995) ("U]njustified accusations ... are
offensive and unprofessional ... [and] should be condemned.'); Kimberly-Clark Corp v Johnson
& Johnson, 745 F2d 1437,1454 (Fed Cir 1984) ("'Fraud in the PTO' has been overplayed, is ap-
pearing in nearly every patent suit, and is cluttering up the patent system."). See also Robert .
Goldman, Evolution of the Inequitable Conduct Defense in Patent Litigation, 7 Harv J L & Tech
37, 85-87 (1993) (discussing the deference afforded to trial courts in making determinations of
fraud).
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Perhaps patentees are not making very many misstatements in their
patents. Or perhaps patentees are lying so cleverly that challengers
cannot meet their burden of proof. Or maybe some patentees are ly-
ing, but not in the patents being challenged. Whatever the explana-
tion-and nobody really knows what it is-few patents are lost be-
cause of lying by patentees.
Second tier informational intermediaries ("STIIs") are another
institutional mechanism for verifying the quality of the information
contained in the patent. If the PTO offered an accurate appraisal of
whether the patent application enabled a person of ordinary skill in
the art actually to make and use an invention that was new, useful, and
nonobvious, and if such an appraisal resulted from a detailed study,
observers may not find replicating the PTO's work worthwhile. If, on
the other hand, the PTO's appraisal of a patent application is per-
ceived to be inaccurate a sufficiently high percentage of the time, then
observers may find it worthwhile to repeat the work of the PTO, in
addition to conducting further evaluation. Similarly, if observers ques-
tion the PTO's reputation for independence, its value as an intermedi-
ary could diminish. Only if the PTO and patentees do not have
aligned interests can the PTO's evaluation of patent applicants be be-
lievable, which is why the PTO's recent focus on becoming more "in-
ventor-friendly" and treating patent applicants as "clients" rather than
quasi-adversaries may damage its credibility. Because the PTO is not
subject to legal liability if it blunders or allows a fraudulent patent to
slip through, the credibility of the PTO as an intermediary is limited.
As a result, observers may choose to rely on STIls that evaluate the
PTO's work.
In recent years, STIIs have emerged that double check the quality
of the work of the first tier informational intermediary, the PTO.""
One such STII is called BountyQuest. ' Patent challengers not content
to accept the PTO's evaluation can pay BountyQuest to attempt to
gather information that could defeat the patent. Patent challengers
129 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has indicated that it intends to enforce the
patent applicant's duty of candor. See, for example, Semiconductor Energy Laboratory Co, Ltd v
Samsung Electronics Co, Ltd, 204 F3d 1368,1377-78 (Fed Cir 2000) (holding that providing mis-
leading translations of relevant documents is a violation of the duty of candor); Elk Corp v GAF
Building Materials Corp, 168 F3d 28,30 (Fed Cir 1999) (stating that patent applicants and their
attorneys must prosecute their applications in the PTO with candor, good faith, and honesty);
Baxter International, Inc v McGaw, Inc, 149 F3d 1321,1329-30 (Fed Cir 1998) (noting that with-
holding information about the state of the prior art from the PTO violates the duty of candor);
Refac International, Ltd v Lotus Development Corp, 81 F3d 1576, 1581 (Fed Cir 1996), citing
Molins, 48 F3d at 1178, for the idea that failure to disclose material information constitutes ineq-
uitable conduct.
130 For example, rating agencies such as Moody's and Standard & Poor's serve as a reputa-
tional intermediary for bonds and other fixed-income investments.
131 See <http://www.bountyquest.com> (visited Mar 26, 2002).
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pay a fee (the "posting fee") to BountyQuest, which then posts on its
website for one month a cash award for information that would in-
validate issued patents. The website indicates the information Boun-
tyQuest needs, the amount of the award, and when the offer expires.
Individuals hoping to claim the bounty ("bounty hunters") submit
documents such as scientific and engineering articles purporting to
show that the patent is not valid. It remains to be seen whether STIIs
such as BountyQuest will become regular players in the market for
evaluating patents. STIIs face a classic chicken and egg problem in
getting started. It is difficult for an STII to attract clients willing to
rely on its judgment until it develops a reputation for evaluating pat-
ents in ways that hold up under judicial scrutiny, but it cannot develop
a reputation without analyzing patents. If investors and other market
actors care enough about evaluating and measuring the attributes of
patents, STIIs and other mechanisms to reduce evaluation costs may
become more popular.
B. Signal Quantity and Quality
Is the patent system more efficient or credible than other means
of conveying information to observers? Securities regulations govern
one mechanism by which information about a firm can be conveyed.
A detailed comparison of the patent system with securities law as a
means of conveying information credibly and cheaply is beyond the
scope of this Article, but a few general comments are in order.
If patent signals duplicate the quantity and quality of information
that would be conveyed to observers through other means such as se-
curities disclosures, then the patent system's value as a signaling
mechanism may be low. Similarly, unless patents and portfolios are
able to convey information more cheaply and reliably than other
mechanisms, the patent system's usefulness and efficiency as a signal-
ing mechanism must be questioned. But if the patent system is able to
convey more information than other mechanisms such as securities
disclosures, or convey the information more cheaply or credibly, or
convey information different from that conveyed by alternative
mechanisms, then we would expect its signaling function to be valu-
able.
One context in which patents and portfolios would serve a par-
ticularly useful signaling function is conveying information in contexts
not subject to securities regulation. We would therefore expect pub-
licly held firms and privately held firms to use patents and portfolios
differently to convey information. We would expect public firms to fo-
cus on maximizing the size of their patent portfolios, whereas private
equity firms-which are not subject to securities regulations-would
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seek to maximize both the quantity and quality of the information dis-
closed. Here's why.
As I have argued, patent signals have costs that will vary along
different margins. Just as information costs will vary, we can expect
that firms' and observers' willingness to bear the costs of interpreting
the patent signal will vary. Because patents are useful in reducing in-
formational asymmetries between firms and capital markets, we would
expect firms to care more about patent signaling when informational
asymmetries are large and when alternative means of conveying in-
formation credibly are limited.
Informational asymmetries are particularly acute when the com-
pany is a start-up firm. Start-ups have short histories, no market repu-
tation, and frequently are in niche markets, often in fast-moving indus-
tries. This combination of factors makes measurement of their growth
prospects, and hence valuation, difficult. All else equal, we would ex-
pect the marginal benefit of a credible means of conveying informa-
tion to be higher for a firm that has no market reputation than for a
firm that can rely on an established reputation. Patent applications,
which are kept secret until the patent is granted, can provide credible
information to investors while keeping it out of the hands of competi-
tors.""
As firm R&D increases, so too does the information asymmetry
between managers and investors.'33 The harder the projects are to
value, the more likely they are to be undervalued. Firms that under-
take hard-to-value projects experience greater share undervaluation
than do firms that engage in projects that are easy to value.'3' Start-up
firms and firms engaging in research projects that are difficult to value
would particularly benefit from mechanisms that allow them to con-
vey credible information about their positive attributes to their rele-
vant audiences. If it is indeed the case that firms engaging in more
R&D get more patents or convey more information through patents,
132 See 35 USC § 122 (1994). A pending patent application is published after eighteen
months unless the patent applicant requests continued confidentiality and certifies that it has not
filed for patent protection on the same invention in another country. Id. We can expect start-up
firms to be less likely to file patent applications abroad and therefore more likely to request con-
fidentiality throughout the pendency of the application. The term of protection begins on the is-
sue date and ends twenty years from the date the inventor filed the application. 35 USC
§ 154(a)(2) (1994).
133 David Aboody and Baruch Lev, Information Asymmetry, R&D, and Insider Gains, 55 J
Fin 2747,2749 (2000) (arguing that R&D is a major contributor to information asymmetry and
insider gains, raising issues concerning management compensation, incentives, and disclosure
policies).
134 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, Equilibrium Short Horizons of Investors and
Firms, 80 Am Econ Rev Papers & Proceedings 148, 148-49 (1990) (discussing reasons for stock
undervaluation).
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then patents may serve to create a separating equilibrium among
firms.
Just as firms have incentives to focus more on signals the more
important it becomes for them to convey information to the market,
we might expect investors in start-ups to be more willing to incur costs
analyzing patent signals than would investors in more established
firms. Unlike shareholders in public firms, who are able to challenge
the power of corporate management to set the firm's strategic agenda
through a variety of control and enforcement mechanisms-both exit
and voice-private equity investors have voice but not exit.'3 As a re-
suit, investors will be stuck with the losses if the firm should fail. Lack
of financial history and reputation make valuation of the firm particu-
larly difficult and increase the chance of insiders exaggerating the
start-up's prospects and opportunistic behavior after financing is re-
ceived. When a firm has investments in hard-to-value projects and
there is asymmetric information regarding the value of those projects,
managers may engage in rational myopia-sacrificing long-term value
by boosting current earnings in order to increase short-term share
values and prevent (or attract) a corporate takeover."
Investors in privately held firms must determine the attributes of
the firm in which they are investing, but measurement of such attrib-
utes is costly. Because entry and exit is more difficult for investors in a
privately held firm, such investors can be expected to place a higher
marginal value on gaining information about each firm's attributes
than would investors in publicly held firms. This higher tolerance for
measurement costs on the part of investors creates an incentive for
privately held firms, more than publicly held firms, to signal to capital
markets in greater detail.
Indeed, evidence indicates that observers place greater emphasis
on patent counts (as opposed to measuring the attributes of individual
patents) of established firms, but focus on both the quantity and qual-
ity of patents and patent applications in the portfolios of less-
established firms. 7 It is not surprising that observers become more
135 Entry and exit by investors from privately held firms is more difficult due to the ex-
tended time horizon of the relationship created by the illiquidity of the securities and the cus-
tomary existence of lock-up clauses in the investing agreement. For a general discussion, see Al-
bert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations and
States 21-29 (Harvard 1970).
136 See Jeremy C. Stein, Efficient Capital Markets, Inefficient Firms: A Model of Myopic
Corporate Behavior, 104 Q J Econ 655, 667-68 (1989); Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and
Managerial Myopia, 96 J Poit Econ 61,62 (1980).
137 Compare studies of established firms, such as Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, Protecting
Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why US. Manufacturing Firms Patent
(Or Not) at 16 (cited in note 28); Griliches, 28 J Econ Lit at 1673, 1684 (cited in note 74); and
Pakes, 93 J Polit Econ at 392 (cited in note 76) (focusing on patent counts), with descriptions of
what venture capitalists and IPO underwriters value, such as Kortum and Lerner, 31 RAND J
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willing to incur measurement costs the less established the firm is.
Venture capitalists place heavy emphasis on the personal characteris-
tics of the entrepreneurs in whose firms they invest. The future value
of a start-up is uncertain and is heavily dependent on the judgments of
the entrepreneurs running it, so the quality of the entrepreneurs is
important. The benefit from measuring the marginal value of an en-
trepreneur's skill may be significant. Evidence of the skills and talents
of entrepreneurs in a start-up firm will influence investors more than
evidence of managerial skill in an established firm. How could patents
inform investors of the marginal quality of entrepreneurs? Patents
may operate as a separating mechanism that identifies those entre-
preneurs with sufficient confidence in their inventions to spend money
communicating them in the form of a patent.
Capital investments, usually from venture capitalists and other
private equity sources, represent the most important funding source
for many firms, particularly early-stage firms.'- Evidence indicates that
financing constraints are more pressing for smaller firms.'3 In particu-
lar, capital constraints appear to limit R&D expenditures. As a re-
sult, we can expect smaller firms to experience higher opportunity
costs for not signaling. Evidence that smaller firms may signal more
than large ones can be found in the fact that smaller firms patent more
intensely per dollar of R&D.14
This phenomenon may have undesirable consequences. Because
the firm's allocation of its efforts will be difficult to observe, it has the
incentive to devote resources to influencing the investors' decision, re-
sources which may be devoted away from productive activity. Know-
ing that a portfolio of patents and patent applications is one feature
investors look for when analyzing the firm, start-ups may choose to
obtain the largest portfolio of patents possible, even if obtaining pat-
Econ 674 (cited in note 87) (examining patenting and venture funding); 60 BNA Patent, Trade-
mark & Copyright J at 280-81 (cited in note 127) (stating that IPO underwriters scrutinize pat-
ent quality). See also Lemley, 95 Nw U L Rev at 1504 (cited in note 2) (stating that large compa-
nies rely on portfolio "volume rather than quality" in licensing negotiations).
138 For an introduction to the private equity industry, see George W. Fenn, Nellie Liang, and
Stephen Prowse, The Private Equity Market: An Overview, 6 Fin Markets, Institutions & Instru-
ments 1 (1997). For a discussion of the constraints early-stage firms face in raising capital, see R.
Glenn Hubbard, Capital-Market Imperfections and Investment, 36 J Econ Lit 193 (1998).
139 See Hubbard, 36 J Econ Lit at 215 (cited in note 138) (arguing that available evidence
suggests that within-firm variation in R&D spending is explained substantially by the within-firm
variation in internal finance).
140 See Charles P. Himmelberg and Bruce C. Petersen, R&D and Internal Finance:A Panel
Study of Small Firms in High-Tech Industries, 76 Rev Econ & Stat 38,38 (1994) (stating that in-
ternal finance is the principal determinant of the rate at which small, high-tech firms acquire
technology through R&D); Bronwyn H. Hall, Investment and Research and Development at the
Firm Level: Does the Source of Financing Matter? *1, *3, Working Paper No 4096 (NBER 1992),
available online at <http://papers.nber.org/papers/W4096> (visited Mar 26,2002).
141 See text accompanying notes 51-52.
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ents reallocates resources away from more profitable activities like
R&D. This reallocation of resources results in a riskier venture for in-
vestors because of the firm's decreased productivity and the decreased
accuracy of the information the firm provides to the investor, resulting
in a decrease in the quality of the investor's decision.
C. Welfare Effects
One frequently encounters the sentiment that the "[t]he state of
the art in the economics of... patent policies seems primitive. ' .. And
so it is. Because the functions and effects of the patent system are cen-
tral to much innovation policy, a better understanding of the reasons
patentees might seek patents and the costs and benefits of patents has
important implications.'43 To the extent patenting creates a separating
equilibrium, patents can allow firms to reduce information asymme-
tries in capital markets. As a result, the welfare costs and incentive ef-
fects of legal rules may be different from those anticipated by com-
mentators and lawmakers who only consider the exclusionary aspects
of patent protection. We need to explore further the ultimate effi-
ciency of patents as informational mechanisms. If patents are efficient
at reducing information asymmetries, what normative implications
does this have for other aspects of patent rights, such as the length of
the patent term and the scope of the rights that should be granted?
On the other hand, if patents are inefficient mechanisms for signaling
or even for directly conveying information, what (if any) legal rules
ought to be changed and how? To what extent are patent signals and
exclusionary rights interrelated? A complete welfare analysis of the
patent system is too complicated to undertake here, but in what fol-
lows I highlight a few aspects of patent signals that warrant further,
and future, consideration.
Does patent signaling use resources, and if so, does it use them ef-
ficiently? Certainly obtaining a patent has costs, both private and so-
cial. Whether patent signaling is efficient largely depends upon
whether one believes patent signaling discloses new information that
would not have been available otherwise or whether it reveals infor-
mation that would have been revealed in time anyway. In other words,
do patents convey new information about firms or are they just exam-
ples of foreknowledge gains?'"
142 Kaplow, 97 Harv L Rev at 1889 (cited in note 11).
143 See, for example, Lanjouw, Pakes, and Putnam, 46 J Indus Org at 429-30 (cited in note
90) (discussing useful insights derived from patent renewal and applications data, and directions
in which this type of analysis could be further developed).
144 See Hirshleifer, 61 Am Econ Rev at 561-62 (cited in note 24).
20021
The University of Chicago Law Review
It may be that the patent system simply identifies firms that pro-
duce better research. They would produce equally good research re-
gardless of whether patents signaled their type. In that case, the signal-
ing function of the patent system has no productive value. It produces
a redistribution of resources in capital markets but no increase in total
product. The private value of having information about the firm re-
vealed more quickly may be positive, but the social value may not. For
example, it may be privately valuable to learn in advance which horse
will win a race but that does not mean that such foreknowledge gains
increase social welfare. Similarly, if patent signaling merely increases
foreknowledge, the social benefits of patent signaling may be trivial
and the costs may result in a social loss. Under those circumstances,
the overall signaling value of patents may be negative.
On the other hand, to the extent patent signals increase allocative
efficiency, there may be real social gains. Suppose that a firm has dif-
ferent advantages in the various areas in which it is conducting re-
search. If this is the case, then patenting may serve as a sorting mecha-
nism that will increase total welfare. The sorting mechanism may op-
erate both ways: not only do investors learn about firm type from pat-
ents issued, but firms learn about their own type (or more realistically,
their own strengths and weaknesses within their research projects).
Patent signaling may create distorted incentives for firms." Along
quantity margins, firms may have the incentive to engage in behaviors
beyond the level at which they would if the behaviors sent no signal.
For example, if the size of a patent holder's portfolio is used as a sig-
nal, then this creates the incentive for patent holders to patent the
smallest publishable unit, and divide what would normally be a single
patent on an invention into multiple smaller patents on different fac-
ets of the same invention. In the end, the same amount of inventing
takes place, but the patent holder's portfolio is larger than it would be
if portfolio size were not a proxy. The end result is a net social loss: the
PTO must examine more patents than it otherwise would, with a con-
comitant waste of administrative resources; would-be licensees of the
invention must now take out a bundle of licenses, not just one, from
the patent holder on an invention that has been sliced into thin strips
of rights; and both parties to the transaction incur more transaction
costs in the form of administrative costs and lawyers' fees.
Along quality margins, firms may focus on manipulating the con-
tents of the signal by "puffing," rather than focusing on assuring the
quality of the underlying patented product. To the extent that such ac-
145 For a general discussion, see R. Glenn Hubbard, ed, Asymmetric Information, Corporate
Finance and Investment (Chicago 1990) (arguing that conditions of asymmetric information can
lead to inefficient signaling); Ayres, 77 Va L Rev at 946-47 (cited in note 100).
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tivity chisels away at the boundaries of the inequitable conduct provi-
sions, it creates an adverse selection problem and reduces the value of
patents as signaling mechanisms. Firms may also choose to behave
strategically, obfuscating information in patents and attempting to
compile portfolios that deliberately obscure information about the
firm so as to foil the would-be Lemelsons of the world.
Excessive signaling could occur if there is a divergence between
the private and social benefits of signaling. One of the private benefits
of signaling is the reduction in the firm's cost of capital through reduc-
ing investors' information costs. If the firm is publicly held, another
benefit is the increase in stock price to the extent signaling allows this
to occur more quickly than it would in the absence of signaling. The
social benefit of patent signaling is the increase in market efficiency
because of the existence of more information about the firm. Even if
excessive signaling is inefficient, it still may be more efficient than the
information costs observers might incur in the absence of patent sig-
nals. Without patents to provide a window (however hazy) into the
firm, investors might carry out inefficient searches in pursuit of better
information. When the two types of inefficiencies are netted out, the
firm's informational advantage may render excessive signaling by the
firm preferable to excessive searches by investors." It is unlikely that
attempts to prevent excessive signaling would be feasible. If avenues
of signaling through patents were shut down, others would open up.
On the other hand, the social benefit of better information might
be swamped by the costs of producing it. Even if the patent system is
one of the best means of conveying information to observers, that
alone does not make it efficient. If the absolute cost of patent signal-
ing is sufficiently high, it may be more efficient to force innovative and
boring firms to pool, rather than bear the administrative costs of al-
lowing patent signaling in order to get separation between types." Ul-
timately, distinguishing between firms using signals to determine the
attributes of a firm may have important effects on allocative efficiency.
Considering the allocative effects of intellectual property portfolios
on information in capital markets leads to a richer and more realistic
portrayal of the reasons for which patents may be obtained, but it
leaves unresolved the question of whether such outcomes enhance ef-
ficiency.
146 John C. Coffee, Jr., Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure
System, 70 Va L Rev 717,733-34 (1984), suggests that the inefficiencies generated by investors'
excessive searches justify the imposition of mandatory disclosure requirements on firms..
147 Philippe Aghion and Benjamin Hermalin, Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can
Enhance Efficiency, 6 J L, Econ, & Org 381, 383-87 (1990) (showing that efforts to separate
goods and bad types may lead good types to signal too much and proposing restrictions on sig-
naling in order to enhance efficiency).
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The costs of interpreting patent signals are positive and vary un-
der different circumstances. When evaluation costs are high, market
actors have the incentive to measure along easily evaluated margins.
Knowing that measurement of the value of their attributes will be in-
complete, firms will have several strategies for using intellectual prop-
erty to signal their value to capital markets. One of these is to maxi-
mize the portfolio along the margin of readily measurable attributes.
Since the number of patents a firm has received is a measurable at-
tribute of a portfolio whereas the quality of individual patents is not,
firms have the incentive to cover the same amount of subject matter
in a portfolio with more rather than fewer patents.
Investors will know that the sheer size of an intellectual property
portfolio is an imperfect indicator of firm quality. If the signal sent by
patents counts is ambiguous (as when a pooling equilibrium occurs), it
may be useless as an indicator of firm quality. Investors may choose
instead to rely on other signals. Alternatively, they may choose to ex-
amine individual patents more closely. This will be much more costly
than relying on sheer patent counts.
Individuals have limited capacities for acquiring and using infor-
mation, over which one can expect diminishing returns. The more in-
formation an individual is given to process, the lower the marginal ca-
pacity to process each piece. Evaluation costs of information also re-
quire that individuals be able to distinguish one signal from another.
As with learning a foreign language, an activity in which individuals
must make irreversible investments, recognizing and deciphering pat-
ent signals requires an initial investment. Similarly, evaluating the in-
formation contained in a patent requires special skills that can ordi-
narily be obtained only through investment in expensive training.
Having learned to interpret a signal, individuals may be loath to invest
in acquiring another means of evaluating the signal. Once the invest-
ment has been made and the means of evaluating the information ac-
quired, it will be cheaper to keep relying on it than to invest in new
channels. This is especially true because the scarcity of the individual
interpreter as an input implies that acquiring new evaluation tech-
niques will diminish the product of old ones. Even if subsequent in-
formation suggested that the signal was noisy, it would not pay to in-
vest in another means of signaling (or interpreting the signal) unless
the expected benefits of learning the new means of signaling were
greater than the expected benefits under the old system plus the costs
of learning the new system (because investors will treat the cost of ac-
quiring the expertise to interpret the signal through the old means as a
sunk cost). As a result, the use of patents as a signaling mechanism




A theory that attempts to place a value on intellectual property
should consider the role patents can play in mitigating informational
problems in capital markets. Intellectual property rights may be valu-
able not just because such rights can create scarcity to public goods in
product markets, but also because they can be used to convey credible
information at low cost to observers and reduce informational asym-
metries between firms and investors. To the extent that patents reduce
information costs about the attributes of the firm obtaining the patent,
firms can derive positive returns from obtaining patents, returns above
and beyond the rents captured in product markets.
The opportunity to gain these positive returns could provide an
incentive to seek patents beyond the point that firms otherwise would
if appropriability conferred the only value of the patent. This might
shed light on why firms continue to seek patents avidly even when
they expect little in capturable rents. To be sure, the value of intellec-
tual property as a means of conveying information in capital markets
is much more conjectural than the value of its use in product markets.
As a result, it is more likely to be underestimated. This might explain
why the value of patents as a means of reducing information asymme-
tries in capital markets has previously been overlooked.
Theoretical analyses and empirical studies of the private value of
patents proceed on the basis of a simplified notion of the incentives
behind patenting. Relaxing the simple view's assumption that the final
value of a patent stems solely from the exclusivity conferred by legal
rules and giving the role of information a more central place in the
analysis of patent rights will create a more nuanced understanding of
the intellectual property system.
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